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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN AN ERA OF
PARTISAN VOLATILITY
Michael A. Livermore
Daniel Richardson*
ABSTRACT
Contemporary politics is characterized by a polarized national discourse,
weak party organizations, volatile control of government, and an increasingly
assertive executive. These political dynamics interact with a system of
administrative law inherited from different political times that is ill-suited to
addressing the risks of the current moment, which include threats to
administrative values such as efficiency, impartiality, and expertise; to
democratic values such as accountability, transparency, and participation; and,
most generally, to the ability of the law to benefit social well-being through
sound policymaking. In recent years, some legal scholars have become attuned
to the interaction between administration and these features of the political
environment. Unfortunately, administrative law itself has been slow to catch up,
with potentially dangerous consequences for the stable functioning of the U.S.
administrative state. Drawing from the political science literature that examines
the interacting features of organized politics that generate stable party systems,
we examine how prior administrative law regimes have responded to political
transformations in the past. With this research in view, we find that
administrative law as it stands today, which emerged during an earlier party
system, is ill-suited to meet the challenges of modern politics. Time will tell
whether courts will shape doctrine to better align administrative law with the
needs of the times.

*
Michael A. Livermore is a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law. Daniel Richardson,
University of Virginia School of Law, J.D., 2018. The views expressed herein are the authors’ alone. Thanks to
Rachel Barkow, Jeffrey Lubbers, Nina Mendelson, Dick Pierce, Teddy Rave, Richard L. Revesz, Mark Tushnet,
Christopher Walker, and workshop participants at the University of Houston Law Center for helpful feedback
on earlier versions of this Article.

LIVERMORERICHARDSONPROOFS_10.28.19

2

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

10/29/2019 10:51 AM

[Vol. 69:1

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 3
I. POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION ........................................................... 8
A. Taking Party Systems Seriously .................................................... 9
1. A Systems-level Perspective on Organized Politics .............. 14
2. Administrative Law through the Party System Lens ............. 17
B. The Versatility of Administrative Law ........................................ 19
C. The Last Era of Administrative Law, 1969–1992 ....................... 29
II. THE CHALLENGES OF PARTISAN VOLATILITY ..................................... 35
A. Partisanship Without Parties ...................................................... 37
B. Oscillating Control ..................................................................... 42
C. Erosion of Stabilizing Institutions .............................................. 49
III. (MAL)ADAPTIVE DOCTRINE ................................................................ 56
A. Review of Policy Reversals ......................................................... 57
B. Agency Independence ................................................................. 64
C. Deference .................................................................................... 68
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 72

LIVERMORERICHARDSONPROOFS_10.28.19

2019]

10/29/2019 10:51 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

3

INTRODUCTION
Debates about the relationship between politics and administration are as old
as modern bureaucracies, extending at least back to foundational figures such as
Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber.1 Early notions of a strict dichotomy between
politics and administration that helped justify the vast discretion granted to
administrative agencies in the early to mid-twentieth century have given way to
an understanding of the inseparability of administration and politics in any
complex legal regime.2 In recent years, some legal scholars have become
particularly attuned to the interaction between administration and features of the
political environment, such as divided versus unified government and political
polarization.3 Unfortunately, administrative law itself has been slow to catch up,
with potentially dangerous consequences for the stable functioning of the U.S.
administrative state.
A recent Supreme Court administrative law intervention illustrates this
claim. In Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that the SEC’s administrative
law judges (ALJs) are subject to selection through the Appointments Clause

1
See Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 232 (H. H. Gerthand
& C. Wright Mills eds., 1946); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 197 (1887).
See generally Dwight Waldo, Politics and Administration: On Thinking about a Complex Relationship, in A
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 89 (Ralph C. Chandler ed., 1987).
2
See PAUL H. APPLEBY, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION (1949); FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT (1900); DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY
OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION xvii (2d ed. 1984); Gerald E. Caiden, In
Search of an Apolitical Science of American Public Administration, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION:
WOODROW WILSON AND AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 51 (Jack Rabin & James S. Bowman eds., 1984)
(discussing mid-century heyday and eventual challenges to more traditional notions of a politics/administration
dichotomy); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L.
ECON & ORG. 81 (1985) (introducing “Law of Conservation of Administrative Discretion”); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
3
See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 28–35 (2018) (surveying literature on congressional
oversight during periods of unified government and finding that Congress uses its power more sparingly during
those periods); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953 (2016);
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014) (arguing that national polarized
politics interacts with federalism); Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee
Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 758 (2011) (discussing “blood-sport”
battles brought on by political incentives); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311
(2006) (arguing that unified control undermines inter-branch competition essential to oversight); Michael A.
Livermore, Political Parties and Presidential Oversight, 67 ALA. L. REV. 45 (2015); Thomas O. McGarity,
Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1711–12
(2012) (examining consequence of polarization); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial
Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014,
64 DUKE L. J. 1645 (2015).
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rather than the independent civil service system.4 Shortly thereafter, the
President issued an executive order removing all ALJs from the competitive civil
service process and subjecting them to political appointment by agency heads.5
The administrative law doctrine announced in Lucia, which was limited to the
SEC, was transmuted almost immediately through political channels to apply
broadly across the government.6 This move occurs against a political backdrop
that includes the growth of presidential administration, an increasingly polarized
electorate, the declining institutional efficacy of political parties, and a pattern
of wildly shifting governing coalitions.7 The seemingly technical constitutional
holding in Lucia is given life by this political context, where the consequences
of upsetting a longstanding compromise that insulates agency adjudicators from
partisan influence will be felt.
This interaction of politics and administrative law is nothing new. Professor
Jerry Mashaw’s work in recovering the “lost era” of American administrative
law documents how the changing landscape of American politics over the course
of the Republic’s first one hundred years were tracked by fundamental
transformations in administrative law and practice.8 When the Jeffersonian Era
of Good Feelings gave way to Jacksonian democracy, for example, that shift was
accompanied by a change in administration that moved away from an emphasis
on governance by “men of good standing” and toward a spoils system that
supported mass political mobilization.9 Legal changes, including a decline in the
importance of qui tam actions and the extension of personal immunity for
official acts, followed these political and administrative changes.10 Similar
linked transformations in political organization, administrative form, and legal
doctrine have been a consistent feature of the U.S. system ever since.

4
5

Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018).
See Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018) (excepting ALJs from the competitive

service).
6
Opposition to the move has been heated, with the President of the American Bar Association referring
to the order as “ill-considered and legally vulnerable.” Letter from Hilarie Bass to Congressman Pete Sessions
and Congressman James McGovern (July 16, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/GAO/ALJlettertorulescommitteeaboutEO.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The
RAA Loses Steam But the Trump Executive Order on ALJ Selection Upturned 71 Years of Practice, 94 CHI.KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
7
See infra Part III.
8
See generally JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
9
Id. at 175.
10
For other foundational work, see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982).
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Indeed, the standard administrative law narrative—which continues to be
embodied in the leading treatises and casebooks—essentially tracks doctrinal
developments against the backdrop of the waxing and waning of the New Deal
coalition.11 The 1932 election brought a realigned and ascendant Democratic
Party to power with a mandate to combat the Great Depression. New Deal
legislation created a massive administrative apparatus that, while building on
prior forms, was something new in American political life. Administrative law
as it is taught and practiced today—from the non-delegation cases to the
Administrative Procedure Act and its subsequent interpretation—remains
shaped by doctrine that arose from a legal order in constant conversation with
the administrative necessities and political realities of that time.12
If contemporary politics do not (yet) rise to the level of crisis represented by
the Great Depression, they nonetheless require a reckoning. Administrative law
could adapt: U.S. history provides an ample storehouse of examples where
jurists and other decision makers responded to the needs of the day by altering
the legal and organizational structures that translate politics into policy. But
success is far from a foregone conclusion. The law could fail to change, or
change in ways that are counterproductive, exacerbating the weaknesses of the
current system while failing to capitalize on its potential.
Borrowing from recent work in political science, we characterize current
politics as an era of “partisan volatility” with several defining characteristics.13
These include weak party organizations alongside strong partisan polarization;
alternating periods of unified and divided government; the accumulation of
policymaking power in the executive; and the weakening of moderating
institutions such as the civil service. Together, these political facts have
important consequences for how administrative law doctrines—from Lucia’s
holding on ALJs to efforts to limit Chevron deference—should be understood.
The core takeaway from our argument is that contemporary administrative
law is poorly suited to the political moment and is poised to become even more
so. In the post-New Deal period of divided government that lasted from 1969–
1992, an almost exclusively Republican executive, aligned around a coalescing
coalition of social conservatives, defense hawks, and business interests,
11
See CHLOE BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 14–29 (6th ed. 2006);
see, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 2017); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 99–123 (7th ed. 2016).
12
Some recent scholarship fails to account for this evolution, treating the current terms of the debate as
if they were universal. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
13
See BYRON E. SHAFER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PATTERN: STABILITY AND CHANGE, 1932–2016
(2016).
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negotiated with a Congress that was the remaining holdout of the traditional
labor-dominated Democratic Party. It was during this period that administrative
law, as recognized today, developed its current form. Core features include
notice-and-comment rulemaking as a chief vehicle for policy change and the
(somewhat contradictory) judicial doctrines of hard look arbitrary or capricious
review and Chevron deference. This period also saw the rise of what Professor
Cass Sunstein refers to as the “cost-benefit state,”14 with its hallmark
characteristic of White House regulatory review.
In retrospect, it is relatively clear that the election of Bill Clinton ended the
period of divided government in favor of the new period of partisan volatility.
Institutionally and doctrinally, change—where it has occurred—has primarily
been accomplished via grafting, rather than the development of new legal
regimes. Practices from the prior era, such as cost-benefit analysis and doctrines
such as Chevron deference took on new meaning with alternating Democratic
and Republican administrations, and during periods of united versus divided
government. For a time, this process of grafting worked well enough, but the
election of Donald Trump at the head of a newly unstable Republican party, and
the level of tempest represented by his administration, may serve as the breaking
point.
The current Supreme Court and the doctrinal program that it seems inclined
to pursue appears extremely ill-suited to the task of responding to the needs
created by this new political dynamic. We will review three areas—the failure
to increase the stringency of review for policy reversals; the breaking down of
politics-insulating barriers within administrative agencies; and the weakening of
Chevron deference—where the current Court majority has made, and is poised
to continue making, doctrine that does not fit the needs of the times. Even if the
Court is set on this unproductive path, understanding the causes and
consequences of today’s institutional and doctrinal pathologies may help future
policymakers and jurists make better choices.15
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I provides a theory of the
relationship between politics and administration and explores how this
14

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION ix (2002).
See Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 S.
CT. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (“[Institutional] realism would entail constitutional and public law doctrines that penetrate
the institutional black box and adapt legal doctrine to take account of how these institutions actually function in,
and over, time.”). The current Supreme Court may be disposed toward the alternative “institutional formalism,”
tinged with an ideological disposition to rein in the administrative state. See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux:
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17–33 (2016) (describing the “current judicial
challenges to national administrative government”).
15
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relationship has unfolded in practice. We find that many of the inflection points
in administrative law align with changes in the governing party system as jurists
and other legal actors respond to their political realities. This alignment is no
accident. Systems of public administration are vitally connected to broader
“party systems.”16 Administrative institutions and doctrines adapt to those
surroundings and, over time, compliment them as a unified (and stable) system.
As Part I demonstrates, many features of our administrative system that emerged
in one stable party system evolve under the pressures of later systems, taking on
new meaning. This interaction has consequences for how we understand the law.
The normative consequences of the answer to any question in administrative
law—whether it be about how best to organize the government, review agency
action, or structure oversight—can only be understood by referencing the
broader political context. And, as this Part demonstrates, that context is shaped
by stable party systems.
Part II examines the current party system, which exerts unique pressures on
effective administration. Some features of the party system (e.g., ideological
polarization and electoral volatility) suggests that policy positions pursued at the
national level are likely to change dramatically and frequently. At the same time,
a growing body of political science literature suggests that current political
actors are not as constrained by forces that could stabilize or moderate more
extreme policymaking. As we demonstrate below, the institutions that have
historically played a stabilizing role in the policy process, including the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the White House, the D.C.
Circuit, and party elites, are increasingly marginalized or subsumed into partisan
politics. Despite these challenges, our modern system of administrative law has
not developed a responsive set of new doctrines to meet them.
Part III discusses three areas where the law could, at least in theory, mitigate
some of the harmful effects of the current party system. First, we consider
judicial review of policy reversals. Policy reversals are more common in the era
of partisan volatility, as administrations change frequently and alternate between
wholly divergent policy views. By constantly looking backward to existing
policy, agencies devote considerable resources to examining the same issues
over and over again, failing to take on new problems. At the same time, frequent
reversals create costly regulatory uncertainty. This tendency could be
counterbalanced through a doctrine that holds agencies to a more rigorous
standard when they reverse course. Second, we look to current constitutional
16
Throughout this Article we use the term “party systems” to refer to stable periods of partisan political
alignment. The concept is explored in greater detail below. See infra Part II.A.1.
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debates regarding agency independence, where the Court has recently resolved
many challenges in ways that conflict with the broader political context.
Specifically, the Court’s tendency to consolidate power over executive branch
agencies and officials under the President is likely to exacerbate instability and
partisanship in the administrative state. Finally, we examine current debates
around judicial deference to agency interpretations of law. Again, the Court
seems set on an unproductive reform path, targeting its review on “major
questions” that tend to generate the most partisan friction. In so doing, it not only
further risks threats to judicial independence, but it also misses an opportunity
to play a stabilizing role by placing additional judicial scrutiny on agency actions
that depart from prior interpretations.
The current era of partisan volatility has placed considerable pressure on
existing institutions and raises challenges to a host of normative values. But the
modern party system that we describe will not survive forever. As we outline
below, stable political dynamics only last so long, and it is likely that the era of
partisan volatility will be replaced by a system that poses different challenges to
effective administration than the ones we now confront. When that new system
emerges, our analysis of the costs and benefits of administrative law doctrine,
which is oriented toward contemporary circumstances, will no longer reflect
reality. At a more general level, however, our aim is to explore the dynamic and
mutually influential connections between law, politics, and administration in
U.S. legal institutions. Regardless of the specifics of the day, a better
understanding of these relationships will allow for more informed policymaking,
regardless of the specific pressures created by a new party system.
I.

POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

In this Part, we develop a theory of how politics and administration
coevolve. Borrowing from the political science literature on party systems, we
present a holistic understanding of this relationship that integrates several
features of political systems, such as unified and divided government or partisan
polarization. Party systems are characterized by several interacting features that
include the balance of power between political parties, the substantive issues
that dominate the policy debate, and the level of ideological and partisan
polarization. No single variable explains any given party system; they all work
in tandem to create a stable set of incentives, pressures, practices, and norms
during each era. These forces, in turn, shape government administration and
administrative law. Next, we demonstrate how this theory operates in practice
through several illustrative examples from prior party systems. We conclude
with a more thorough discussion of the era of divided government, which
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stretched from 1968 until 1992 and gave us much of our modern administrative
law. As this Part shows, the era that ended in 1992 had unique political features
and supported doctrine that may be ill-suited to other times.
A. Taking Party Systems Seriously
Although administrative law scholars have long been interested in the
interaction of politics and administration, important features of this dynamics—
at least as it has developed in the United States—have been overlooked. In the
following discussion, we draw on existing literature from both political science
and administrative law to argue that the relationship between politics and
administration can be illuminated by understanding politics through the lens of
party systems. Organized politics arises from the complex interplay of many
social and political forces; the party systems literature focuses on a particular
element of the resulting dynamic: periods of stability characterized by
consistency in political institutions and behavior, interspersed by periods of
transition and change. Party systems are at least partially stable and facilitate
(and are facilitated by) corresponding systems of administration and
administrative law. But just as stable party systems engender stable
administrative systems, political change often brings administrative change as
well. Focusing on stability and change at the systems level helps clarify how
broader social and political focuses have helped shape U.S. administrative law
over the past two centuries.17
The idealized notion that there is or can be a sharp distinction between
politics and administration has long been abandoned.18 Nevertheless,
administrative law is still sometimes treated as a set of abstractly derived and
transcendentally applicable principles, rather than as part of a consistently
shifting political landscape.19 But administrative law doctrines are far more
17
For perspectives on the use of complexity theory to understand system-level dynamics in politics, see
generally POLITICAL COMPLEXITY: NONLINEAR MODELS OF POLITICS (Diana Richards ed., 2000). See also J.B.
Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its
Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) (discussing intersection of complexity theory
and law).
18
Compare Wilson, supra note 1, at 201 (Wilson advocated for a separate science of administration, apart
from politics: “This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths
of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown
its duties with dutifulness.”), with Waldo, supra note 2, at 91 (“Nothing is more central in thinking about public
administration than the nature and interrelations of politics and administration. Nor are the nature and
interrelations of politics and administration matters only for academic theorizing. What is more important in the
day-to-day, year-to-year, decade-to-decade operation of government than the ways in which politics and
administration are conceptualized, rationalized, and related one to the other.”).
19
See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 12 (arguing that modern administrative law violates the common
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intelligible (both normatively and positively) as components of a much larger
complex of legal, political, social, and administrative/bureaucratic systems.
Changes in the political environment both alter how doctrine functions and exert
the kinds of destabilizing pressure that can result in doctrinal change.
Descriptive accounts of the causes or consequences of administrative law that
fail to account for political context are incomplete. Normative judgments about
the goodness or badness of an administrative law doctrine lack substance unless
reference is made to the political circumstances in which they will operate.
There is considerable descriptive literature that examines administrative law
and institutions through a political lens. An important thread in this literature
examines how administrative processes and structures respond to political
pressures, especially during transitional moments. For example, focusing on the
legislative process behind core administrative law statutes, political scientists
Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast argue that legislators
bargain over structure because they view it as essential to producing desired
policy outcomes.20 Under their account, the enacting majority uses its position
not only to directly affect the law through substantive choices, but also to
structure the administrative process.21 In particular, the administrative process is
used to empower the interests and groups favored by the enacting majority
during the implementation of new statutory regimes, when Congress’s ability to
monitor agencies and effect substantive changes to the law has waned.22
Congress’s use of procedure to achieve political outcomes conflicts with the
President’s desire to enact political priorities through implementation, with the
courts often left balancing the two efforts at political influence.23
law Anglo-American tradition); CHRISTOPHER YOO & STEVEN CALABRESI, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (arguing that the administrative state was unconstitutional
from its creation as an originalist matter). There is also a substantially functionalist understanding of
administrative law doctrine that focuses on how doctrines work in practice. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984)
(arguing in favor of function-based understanding of separation of powers principles).
20
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 432 (1989)
(“[L]egislators see the choice of administrative structures and processes as important in assuring that agencies
produce policy outcomes that legislators deem satisfactory.”).
21
Id.
22
See Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political Control
and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 604 (1989); see also Brian D. Feinstein, Designing Executive
Agencies for Congressional Influence, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 259, 266 (2017) (conducting an empirical assessment
of how agency design features support ongoing congressional oversight).
23
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,
1753 (2009) (“Rather, I credit the Court with an awareness of certain political facts in developing administrative
law: Congress creates agencies with few constraints on their power and then seeks to control their

LIVERMORERICHARDSONPROOFS_10.28.19

2019]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

10/29/2019 10:51 AM

11

Conflict over structure extends beyond interest group-oriented fights in the
legislature. Terry Moe and Scott Wilson focus on interactions between the
President and Congress, and in particular on efforts by each institution to
“engineer the structure of public bureaucracy and exercise control over it ....”24
For Moe and Wilson, although the conflict between the legislature and the
President often plays out in the context of specific policy debates—and therefore
might appear to be about ideological commitments—the “more fundamental
struggles” are “battles over structure.”25 Important features of the administrative
state, such as the civil service and regulatory review, represent an equilibrium
that develops between contesting institutions, each vying for a greater share of
influence over administrative decision-making.26
Although given less attention by political scientists, political circumstances
may affect administrative law in the courts as well. At the level of individual
decisions, there is a longstanding literature that correlates the political affiliation
of Justices with their favored outcomes, a literature that has been extended to the
federal courts.27 However, that literature tends to focus on case outcomes, such
as whether employers or employees prevail in a discrimination suit, rather than
on structural questions concerning, for example, the standard of review. Even
interactions between institutions—for example, whether judges are more willing
to overturn the actions of cross-party Presidents—provide only limited insight
on how external political circumstances affect the course of the law more
generally. And judges themselves are frequently reticent to acknowledge how
political circumstances might influence their decisions.28
decisionmaking, just as the President does. In essence, agencies are subject to two political principals.
Furthermore, these principals may have divergent policy preferences and may seek agency decisions that move
in different, even conflicting, directions. Under these circumstances, the Court might see its role as mediating
the needs of both political branches for control of agency decisionmaking, consistent with separation of powers.
In sincerely attending to procedural issues in connection with agency decisionmaking, the Court has attended to
the needs of the legislative branch. It has rendered agency action more susceptible to ongoing congressional
oversight ....”).
24
Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 4 (1994).
25
Id. at 3–4.
26
See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 813–14 (2017) (describing
how different models of legal advice in the executive branch empower different actors).
27
See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 140–145 (1976);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993);
Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); see also
Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in
the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REV. 96, 114 (1922). See generally LEE ESPTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 27 (2013).
28
Chief Justice John Roberts famously said of his position: “my job is to call balls and strikes ....” See
Chief Justice Roberts Statement—Nomination Process, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-
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One exception to this reticence came from Justice Scalia. Prior to his initial
appointment to the D.C. Circuit, Scalia was a co-editor for Regulation magazine
and published an essay on administrative law subjects shortly after Ronald
Reagan took office in 1981. In that essay, Scalia was quite explicit about the
interaction between general administrative principles and the politics of the
moment, especially given what he (correctly) saw as the significance of the
Reagan election. In his words:
At a time when the GOP has gained control of the executive branch
with an evident mandate for fundamental change in domestic policies
... every curtailment of desirable agency discretion obstructs
(principally) the departure from a Democrat-produced, pro-regulatory
status quo.
....
Executive-enfeebling measures ... do not specifically deter regulation.
What they deter is change. Imposed upon a regulation-prone
executive, they will on balance slow the increase of regulation; but
imposed upon an executive that is seeking to dissolve the encrusted
regulation of past decades, they will impede the dissolution.
Regulatory reformers who do not recognize this fact, and who continue
to support the unmodified proposals of the past as though the
fundamental game had not been altered, will be scoring points for the
other team.29

As will be discussed below, then-editor Antonin Scalia was accurately
responding to a political reality that had been in place for roughly a decade, in
which the Republican Party was able to largely sustain control of the White
House, while Democrats held Congress. In this political context, greater
discretion granted to the executive had a substantive effect of shifting policy
away from a “Democratic-produced, pro-regulatory status quo.”30 Once taking
his position on the judiciary, and especially at the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
implemented his vision of executive empowerment, in part by becoming the
chief defender of Chevron deference.31 Unsurprisingly, once on the Court, the
resources/educational-activities/chief-justice-roberts-statement-nomination-process
[https://perma.cc/E63DAYTG].
29
Antonin Scalia, Regulatory Reform—The Game Has Changed, 4 REGULATION 13, 13–14 (1981).
30
Id. at 13.
31
See United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 256–57 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To decide the
present case, I would adhere to the original formulation of Chevron.... We accordingly presume—and our
precedents have made clear to Congress that we presume—that, absent some clear textual indication to the
contrary, Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that
the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows. Chevron sets forth an across-the-board
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justifications he offered for executive deference changed—abandoning his prior
language of raw-knuckled partisan advantage, Justice Scalia favored a
justification grounded in Congress’s intent.32 Nevertheless, the political reality
that deference transferred power to a consistently Republican executive
remained a background fact during the time that Justice Scalia was developing
and expounding his views. Given that he specifically called attention to these
background realities, drawing a causal connection between those political
circumstances and his later jurisprudence does not seem entirely unwarranted.
From a normative perspective, law scholars have recently focused on the
interaction of administrative law and the facts of the political environment. For
example, Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes argue in a 2006 paper that the party
composition of the government closely affects congressional oversight of the
executive, with unified party control of government enfeebling Congress’s
executive-checking function.33 Jessica Bulman-Pozen examined the
consequences of nationally oriented and ideologically polarized parties for
federal-state interactions in the administration of national policy programs.34
Bulman-Pozen argues that states have become sites of partisan contestation, with
state government officials using their platforms to engage in ideologically
charged actions to either antagonize or facilitate national-level policymaking.35
Neal Devins and David Lewis have examined the interaction of party
polarization and agency independence, finding that insulating factors, such as
for-cause removal provisions, have only limited ability to reduce partisan
influence over independent agencies.36 Thomas McGarity has examined the
consequences of polarization for the rulemaking process and in particular the
role of interest in influencing political oversight over agencies.37 Eric Posner and
Cass Sunstein note the prevalence of “flip-flops” in views over institutional
constraints as party control changes hands.38 Earlier work by Livermore
presumption, which operates as a background rule of law against which Congress legislates: Ambiguity means
Congress intended agency discretion. Any resolution of the ambiguity by the administering agency that is
authoritative—that represents the official position of the agency—must be accepted by the courts if it is
reasonable.” (citations omitted)).
32
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 516 (1989).
33
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 3, at 2339.
34
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 3, at 1080 (arguing that national polarized politics interacts with
federalism).
35
Id.; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1267 (2009) (citing Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544 (1994)).
36
Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of
Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 462 (2008).
37
McGarity, supra note 3, at 1678.
38
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 486 (2016).
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examines the interaction between the structure of party politics and executive
and congressional oversight.39 Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell argue
that the entire legal apparatus of administrative law—with its focus on
regularized procedures and judicial review—is out of step with administrative
realities such as the importance of White House regulatory review.40 With the
election of Donald Trump, prominent law scholars have begun to examine the
outer boundaries of administrative law that might be tested by an executive bent
on disobedience.41
This growing literature grapples in important ways with the connection
between administrative law and politics, and each contains an important element
of the overall picture. We build on this work by emphasizing the connections
between the overall structure of organized politics—the party system—and
bureaucratic institutions and related legal rules.
1. A Systems-level Perspective on Organized Politics
Political science work on U.S. party systems investigates periods of stability
in the organization of politics as well as the dynamics of change between these
systems.42 Periods of relative stability include the years 1800–1828, when the
Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans governed an essentially one-party state,
and the years 1898–1932 when a reformed Republican coalition dominated a
more regional Democratic Party. These periods were characterized by lasting
and consistent patterns in the organization of political life. The patterns retained

39
Matthew S. Broker & Michael A. Livermore, Centralizing Congressional Oversight, 32 J.L. & POL.
261, 261 (2017); Livermore supra note 3, at 47.
40
Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1137, 1160 (2014).
41
See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and
the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 687 (2018).
42
See, e.g., SHAFER, supra note 13, at xii. The transitions between party systems are often accompanied
by “realignment elections” that demarcate when an old order has given way to a new. See, e.g., Alan I.
Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate, 60 J. POL. 634, 636 (1998)
(applying the theory to the 1994 and 1996 elections and finding that they resulted a realignment of party
loyalties). See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND
REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 35–36 (1983); V.O. Key, Jr., A Theory of Critical
Elections, 17 J. POL. 3, 3–4 (1955). Roosevelt’s 1932 victory is the paradigmatic case of a realignment election.
When political shifts (and accompanying legal changes) are sufficiently tectonic, they might even be referred to
as “constitutional moments.” BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 58 (1991) (describing
Reconstruction and the New Deal as the second and third constitutional moments). The paradigm of party
systems and realignment elections has been challenged as failing to capture the nuances of partisan change. See
DAVID R. MAYHEW, ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF AN AMERICAN GENRE 12 (2002). Although
these critiques may have merit, we stick with the language of party systems and realignments for expositional
reasons, understanding that the reality may not be as pat.
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some coherence over time, until eventually—after a period of transition—giving
way to new forms of organization.
A focus on party systems springs from the centrality of parties (broadly
understood) to the organization of politics in the United States. Parties serve a
variety of functions, including aggregating voter preferences and organizing
disparate groups together to compete in elections.43 The structure of American
elections favors an equilibrium of two dominant political parties.44 The
interaction between these parties helps define the politics of that era. These eras
are referred to within the political science literature as party systems.45
These systems can be compactly understood through three organizing
concepts: party balance, ideological polarization, and substantive conflict.46 The
first concept captures the relative strength of the parties in electoral politics. The
latter two concepts capture the breadth of the ideological differences between
the parties and the substantive issues that make up their policy agendas,
respectively.47 From the Founding generation’s feuds between Hamilton and
Jefferson to the polarization of the current political environment, these
organizing concepts help to demarcate different periods of American life and to
understand the resulting policy outcomes. Politics in the United States have
progressed through many distinct phases, including the Jacksonian Era, New
Deal Democratic dominance, and the entrenched divided government of the
latter half of the twentieth century.48
43
Parties can also be understood beyond their impact on the electoral process, such as through their
associational features. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986) (finding that
political parties have associational rights under the First Amendment that limit state regulation). Parties can also
be understood as purely endogenous institutions that serve as tools for elected officials. See generally JOHN
ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 28–29 (1995).
For our purposes, however, political parties are important for their electoral consequences and the subsequent
substantive conflicts that emerge from their representation in office. For a broader study of the many roles played
by the modern American political party, see generally MARJORIE RANDON HERSHEY, PARTY POLITICS IN
AMERICA 6–10 (17th ed. 2017) (defining parties as including “the party organization,” “the party in government”
and “the party in the electorate”). As Justice Reed explained, “... political parties ... were created by necessity,
by the need to organize the rapidly increasing population, scattered over our Land, so as to coordinate efforts to
secure needed legislation and oppose that deemed undesirable.” Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 220–21 (1952).
44
See also Kenneth Benoit, Duverger’s Law and the Study of Electoral Systems, 4 FRENCH POL. 69, 70
(2006) (stating Duverger’s Law as: “The simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system”).
See generally MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN
STATE 207–08 (Barbara North & Robert North trans., 1954).
45
William Nisbet Chambers, Party Development and the American Mainstream, in THE AMERICAN
PARTY SYSTEMS: STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 3-4 ( William Nisbet Chambers & Walter Dean
Burnham eds., 2d ed. 1967).
46
See SHAFER, supra note 13, at xii.
47
Id.
48
Chambers, supra note 45, at 3.
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The pattern by which these systems emerge and collapse is familiar.49 A
stable party system exists when the two major parties compete for voters and
influence, each winning over a relatively consistent coalition of voters. This
coalition may lock in a majority of the electorate, leading to a period of sustained
dominance. The coalitions may also be evenly matched, such that competitive
elections are common. In either event, the coalitions themselves remain stable,
even if the outcomes are less predictable. Moreover, the Constitution’s division
of power may allow one party to lock in control of a single branch, while the
other branch or state governments continue to support their opposition.50 As a
result, a stable party system may nonetheless include predictable periods of
divided government.51 Periods of relative stability can be upset by major
political change. These inflection points often involve “realignment elections”
that destabilize the status quo.52 Once the dust settles, new political affiliations
take hold, with different coalitions and political dynamics.53 Although there is
49

Id.
See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 3, at 1080, 1108 (arguing that both the state and federal
governments are “sites of partisan affiliation,” such that voters are likely to identify more with a state government
when the federal government is controlled by an opposing party).
51
DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS,
1946-2002, 4-5 (2005).
52
The concept of realignment elections has played a prominent role in political science since the
publication of V.O. Key, A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J. POL. 3 (1955). See also WALTER DEAN BURNHAM,
CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2–3 (1970) (providing an early account of
critical realignment elections). See generally MAYHEW, supra note 42, at 7–12 (summarizing the subsequent
literature in this area). A similar dynamic is also observed in the policy process, where “political processes are
characterized by stability and incrementalism, but occasionally ... produce large-scale departures from the past.”
James L. True, Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability
and Change in Policymaking, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 155 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 2007). Mayhew
is critical of the concepts of realigning elections and critical elections as oversimplified and inaccurate. To
Mayhew, these ideas fail because specific empirical claims that result from the theory concerning how long party
systems last, whether critical elections look different from other elections, or whether specific policy outcomes
result from critical elections, sometimes lack support. MAYHEW, supra note 42, at 142. Although interesting,
Mayhew’s critiques are largely orthogonal to how party systems are understood in this Article, as sustained
periods of stable electoral coalitions, which in turn coincide with stable periods of administration. The empirical
claims rejected by Mayhew are not required for this more modest use of the theory.
53
The cyclical patterns of stability and realignment that characterize party systems can exist alongside
other patterns of change, cyclical and otherwise. Political scientist Stephen Skowronek, for example, has argued
for a cyclical notion of “political time” that is tied to the presidential leadership. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE AND REAPPRAISAL x (2011). There are also wellrecognized secular trends that have endured across party systems, such as the growing reach and complexity of
the administrative state. American politics is also, of course, embedded within broader historical realities
involving, for example, race, gender, culture, globalization, and technological development. See, e.g., THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1992) (examining intersection of gender and politics during origin period of U.S. welfare state). Our
examination of the relationships between party systems and administrative law is not meant to endorse any
particular cleavage between law and society, but rather to emphasize an underappreciated set of interactions
within the broader interpenetration of law and society. See William J. Novak, Response: The People’s Welfare
50

LIVERMORERICHARDSONPROOFS_10.28.19

2019]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

10/29/2019 10:51 AM

17

no uniform agreement on the boundaries of each party system,54 many inflection
points are widely recognized as producing systemic changes in American
politics.
2. Administrative Law through the Party System Lens
We draw from the literature on party systems to derive two basic insights
concerning the interaction between administrative law and the organization of
politics. The first and most general is that the organization of politics can be
understood as periodized, meaning that over certain periods, there is a relatively
stable and understandable structure to politics.55 During these periods, politics
is not just “one damn thing after another,” but instead involves stable patterns
over time.56 Because administrative law interacts with politics, the stable
dynamics of a party system will help shape a corresponding stable administrative
system. The party systems literature shows that the organization of politics is
not a matter of a single variable that might change over time, but the interaction
of several variables (i.e., party balance; polarization; substantive dimensions)
that tend to form stable regimes.57 Administrative law responds to regime-level
characteristics, and therefore is best understood by looking to the system as a
whole, rather than any single political reality (e.g., unified or divided
government). Periods of transition between party systems demonstrate the
dynamic and versatile nature of administrative law and administrative
institutions.

Redux, 57 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 248, 249 (2017) (“[T]he separation of law from politics and both from society
and/or economy [is] an obstacle to historical understanding.”).
54
The election of 1968, for instance, has led to scholarly disagreement. See generally ARTHUR C.
PAULSON, ELECTORAL REALIGNMENT AND THE OUTLOOK FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6–9 (2007) (surveying
the academic disagreement on whether or not the 1968 election constituted a realignment).
55
Chambers, supra note 45, at 7.
56
Periodization raises its own set of issues concerning where to draw lines, and more generally, the
criteria to use when engage in the line-drawing exercise. For an alternative to the party system approach, see
JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION, 1838–1893, 6 (1991) (offering alternative periodization of
political eras based on “other constituents of the political nation besides electoral behavior—the nature of
political leadership, the importance of particular political institutions, the strength of government, popular
attitudes toward politics, and the like”). We maintain the party system approach in part because of its familiarity
and, more so, because it tracks features of the political environment that are particularly important for
administrative law. That said, we also recognize that the party system framework might miss elements of
political context—such as changes popular attitudes toward the role of experts—that are important to
administrative law and may not be reflected in the structure of organized politics. For the origins of the “one
damn thing after another” quote, see QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/09/02/life-one/
(last visited July 6, 2019).
57
See SHAFER, supra note 13, at xii.
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From a normative perspective, the fit between an administrative law regime
and its political period has important consequences. A mismatch between
administrative law and the broader political context can have a wide range of
undesirable effects across a variety of normative dimensions that include
administrative values such as efficiency, impartiality, legality, and expertise;58
democratic values such as accountability, transparency, and participation; and,
most generally, in the ability of the law to benefit social well-being through
sound policymaking. Consideration of these kinds of social consequences may
affect (and under some jurisprudential theories, should affect) judges’ choices
when shaping the law.59 Even if these considerations do not ultimately inform
changes to legal doctrine or public policy, however, they are still a necessary
part of understanding the effects of new developments.
Our second insight draws from the party systems literature to identify a
specific break in the organization of politics in 1992, when a basic
transformation occurred that only became apparent after some time.60 This new
system, discussed extensively in Part II, is a meaningful break from the past. The
differences between the system we now find ourselves in and the one that
preceded it are vital to understanding the challenges of modern administrative
law.61 It is often noted that current doctrine seems ill-suited to these challenges;
although the reasons for the mismatch are often unexplained. A theory of
administration that accounts for party systems explains why such a mismatch
exists. Our current doctrines largely emerged during a time quite unlike the
present. The party system approach helps clarify the causes and consequences
of the current shortfalls in administrative law.

58
For an account of the demand of the rule of law on administrative agencies, see Kevin M. Stack, An
Administrative Jurisprudence, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985 (2015).
59
See Charles L. Barzun, Three Forms of Legal Pragmatism, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2018).
Accounting for the organization of politics when shaping administrative law doctrine is not the same, and should
not be understood as, judges using their position to construct law that favors a particular party program (Justice
Scalia’s example notwithstanding). Rather, judges can take a pragmatic perspective that encompasses both the
deep values embedded in the law as well as the political and administrative landscape in which their decisions
will be given effect.
60
SHAFER, supra note 13, at 122–23 (“Neither of these intendedly major changes, a new kind of party
balance fostered by growing partisan independence or revised partisan majorities built on moving against
ideological polarization, ever came close to realization. Someone had to win, and Bill Clinton did. Yet none of
these putative strategic theories were of any use in predicting the veritable kaleidoscope of electoral outcomes
that would follow.... The presence of all possible combinations of election outcomes and, even more strikingly,
their rapid circulation and replacement, was what distinguished this period electorally from its predecessors.”).
61
See Mark Tushnet, Politics as Rational Deliberation or Theater: A Response to Institutional FlipFlops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 82, 83 (2016) (arguing that “charges of flip-flopping [over inconsistent positions on
questions such as presidential power] result from the specific circumstances of contemporary U.S. politics, with
a hyperpartisan and ideologically polarized party system”).
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B. The Versatility of Administrative Law
There is a rich body of political science literature documenting the party
systems that have existed in this country since its founding.62 Administrative law
scholars have also examined legal regimes as they have existed at various time
in the past, demonstrating how the law responded to the dominant political and
social dynamics.63 The aim of this section is to bring these two projects together.
In doing so, we find that party systems track with stable periods of administrative
law. When party systems change, the law tends to change with it. In some cases,
existing parts of administrative law evolve to take on new meaning, such as
judicial review doctrines following the New Deal.64 At other times, new
institutions or doctrines emerge to respond to political forces, such as the rise of
civil service administration in the Gilded Age.65 In the end, this history suggests
that administrative law is versatile and dynamic, responding to its political
context.
This perspective can help destabilize current debates in administrative law—
for example, over the removability of independent agency heads, the vitality of
Chevron deference, or the proper approach to arbitrary and capricious review—
which have taken on an aura of permanence. In reality, these debates are
relatively recent and contextual. Remembering the versatility of U.S.
administrative law—how it has been shaped to meet different demands at
different times—undermines the sense that administrative law responds to some
set of transcendent good-for-all-time principles rather than needs of the moment.
The role of the New Deal realignment in shaping U.S. administrative law is
well-known,66 but these are hardly the only examples of innovation in
administrative law or practice in response to a transition between party system.
One early inflection point occurred in 1828, with the decline and dissolution of
the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican Party in favor of the first version of the
contemporary Democratic Party, with Andrew Jackson at its head. This election
is widely viewed as marking a transition from the first U.S. party system to the

62
See, generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER. THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1840 (1969).
63
See generally JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
64
See infra notes 110–115 and accompanying text.
65
See generally SILBEY, supra note 56.
66
The post-New Deal period generated a considerable amount of administrative law doctrine that is
sufficiently vital that it continues to be taught in introductory administrative law courses. See LAWSON, supra
note 11 (categorizing the development of law as “Before the New Deal,” “The New Deal,” and “After the New
Deal”).
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second,67 but it also serves as a transition between two very different systems of
administration.
Administration during the Jeffersonian period had a variety of characteristics
that interacted with the politics of the time. During the Jeffersonian period, a
patrician approach to governance coincided with a very broad political coalition
that covered, more or less, the entirety of the American elite political class.68
Although there were differences and debates within the Jeffersonian coalition,
there were also sustained efforts by party leadership to maximally expand the
party coalition.69 Given the party’s reach, the group of respected party members
overlapped more or less perfectly with social elites. So, selecting government
officials based on party loyalty or professed ideology was redundant.
The small government and legislature-focused ideology of the DemocraticRepublican party sometimes clashed with its policy ambitions, leading to the
seemingly contradictory broad delegation of power to the President or
administrative official to oversee complex regimes, such as the development of
western lands and the embargo of French and British commerce.70 Other
peculiarities of administration law of the era were a better fit for patrician, small
government ideology. In early America, judicial review took the form of suits
against officers personally, rather than the government.71 In the era before
qualified immunity, the officer’s only defense to such a private suit was to claim
authorization by law.72 The resulting court oversight, while capable of
determining the legality of official conduct, also led to a “system of common
law remedies [that was able to] disable administration” by paralyzing officials

67

See generally RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: PARTY FORMATION
(1966).
68
See MASHAW, supra note 8, at 58–59 (describing the Washington Administration’s focus on finding
administrators with “fitness of character” as the primary means of exercising internal discipline); id. at 175
(explaining the transition to a more bureaucratized approach to internal control during the Second Party System,
when there was a much broader electorate).
69
See generally GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS (1989).
70
See MASHAW, supra note 8, at 98, 126 (discussing embargo and public lands management,
respectively).
71
Federal sovereign immunity still bars some claims against the government directly, and suits against
officers are still common. Nonetheless, statutes like the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Tucker Act, and the
Administrative Procedure Act now waive sovereign immunity in many contexts for which relief was barred in
Early America. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58
OKLA. L. REV. 439, 458 (2005) (documenting “the proliferation of statutory waivers of sovereign immunity”).
72
The legality of government conduct would often be tested by determining the validity of the
authorization defense. This was the posture of classic cases like Little v. Barreme, where contests about inherent
presidential authority and statutory interpretation arise in the context of personal actions against officers. 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804). These cases could arise in state as well as federal courts. See, e.g., Olney v. Arnold,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 308, 308 (1796).
IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 3
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with personal liability.73 The relatively thin administrative apparatus and the
personal posture of suits against government officials also placed courts in the
position of deciding quasi-administrative questions, such as whether a vessel
was seaworthy.74 A lack of national-level policymaking capacity as well as
notions of local self-governance popular at the time also fit with the regulatory
importance of state and local governments.75
Even when Congress did decide that a larger federal bureaucracy was
necessary during this period, it included features that empowered private actors.
This took the form of qui tam statutes, which allow private persons to assert the
rights of the government. These statutes were common in the colonial period
and used by states for much of early American history,76 helping solve the
“difficult management challenge created by a large and dispersed federal
workforce.”77 In tandem with the other common law remedies, these statutes
helped maintain control in a period before a bureaucratic and professional civil
service. They also reinforced a political ideology skeptical of government
intrusion.
Jackson’s election changed American politics, and administrative form
quickly followed. The reformed Democratic Party was engineered by figures,
such as Martin Van Buren, with a specific set of ideological and political goals.
Partially, the party’s leaders sought a return to the principles of small and weak
federal government at the root of Jefferson’s party, which had gradually drifted
in the direction of the Federalists’ orientation toward nation-building.78
Additionally, Van Buren viewed with great fear the prospect that, with the
dissolution of the ecumenical Democratic-Republicans, partisan differences
73

MASHAW, supra note 8, at 114.
Id. at 74.
75
See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 1 (1996).
76
Randy Beck, Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 41,
44–45 (2018) (“Regulation of government officials through qui tam legislation was widely practiced in the
American colonies and early states. Qui tam monitoring was used to promote statutory compliance by an
enormous variety of state officials, particularly those performing decentralized functions such as road
construction and maintenance, judicial administration, and regulation of commercial activities. It was common
for early states to rely on qui tam oversight to ensure lawful conduct by officials performing functions critical to
public confidence in government, such as conducting elections and collecting taxes.”).
77
See Randy Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Federal Officials: A Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1235, 1294 (2018) (“Why did Congress authorize qui tam enforcement of two forfeitures directed at
customs officials under the Collection Act when it opted not to use qui tam enforcement for other aspects of the
legislation? The decision likely flowed from the difficult management challenge created by a large and dispersed
federal workforce.”).
78
See generally DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 123 (1994)
(examining Jefferson’s politics in comparison to Federalist and Whig viewpoints).
74
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might map onto regional differences, allowing the issue of slavery—largely
submerged during the early years of the Republic—to rise to the forefront of
American politics.79 The Democratic Party coalition was largely structured to
avoid this possibility by threading together a geographically diverse set of
interests.80
For the first time in U.S. history, political parties oriented toward mass
mobilization took up a central place in the organization of political life.81 Antiparty sentiment that had characterized American political culture since the
colonial period was abandoned in favor of an embrace of a collective approach
to politics that emphasized the inevitability of conflict in a pluralistic society and
the need for institutions capable of mediating that conflict.82 The increased
emphasis on enhancing the organizational capacity of parties was both a reason
for and response to an exploding level of electoral participation among voters,
especially in national elections.83
The politics of the Jacksonian period favored a very different approach to
administration. With the most divisive issue of the day driven out of focus by
the geographic structure of the parties, political contestation focused on
distributive questions, with ideological disputes between the dominant
Democratic Party and the opposition Whigs limited to the old limitedgovernment-versus-nation-building question. In addition, the mass mobilization
politics of the era made government by patrician substantially less palatable.
Together, the redistributive and anti-elite components of Jacksonian populism
led to the spoils system, an approach to administration that lasted in one form or
another until the Progressive Era at the turn of the century. In place of the
Jeffersonian emphasis on the longstanding office holder, the spoils system
placed party loyalists into administrative posts on a rotating basis. This system
of rewards provided immediate financial incentives for party participation,
helping to fuel mass mobilization. It also helped spur, perhaps ironically, a more
79
See, e.g., ROBERT REMINI, MARTIN VAN BUREN AND MAKING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 123 (1959)
(detailing Van Buren’s attempt to build the Democratic Party during the period of increased suffrage before the
election of Andrew Jackson).
80
See RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: PARTY FORMATION IN THE
JACKSONIAN ERA 14 (1966) (describing how the Democratic Party competed in different regions of the country).
81
SILBEY, supra note 56, at 46.
82
See generally id. (discussing embrace of parties during this time).
83
There was a threefold increase in the absolute number of votes cast in the 1824 and 1828 presidential
elections, primarily driven by a growth of voter turnout. Popular vote numbers are collected by the American
Presidency Project, housed at U.C. Santa Barbara. See John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu. Population statistics are available at BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970
(1975), https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/histstats-colonial-1970.pdf.
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bureaucratic civil service: Clear roles were far more important when governance
was carried out by rotating party members.84 As the bureaucracy, including law
enforcement, became more professional, the need for extensive qui tam actions
also diminished.85
Jacksonian America was undone by the Civil War and subsequent
Reconstruction, replacing Democratic dominance with a period of closely
divided elections.86 The years after the war also strained the federal
government’s capacity, as Congress and the President found it difficult to
manage the growing bureaucracy.87 Administrative law responded to these
forces. First, the patronage system, which was now so large that presidential
management was no longer possible, was gradually replaced by a civil service
system. The merit-based system allowed each presidential administration to
insulate personnel from their successors, who were often of a different party.88
Second, the agencies of the time developed their own internal procedures to fill
the void left by an overwhelmed legislative branch, often proposing legislation
to codify their existing practices.89 Together, these two changes empower
relatively insulated administrators to weather a period of political volatility.
Another moment when a transition in American politics led to a remaking of
administrative law and practice was after the election of William McKinley in
1896. This election ended the postbellum period of relatively evenly matched
contests between the Republican and Democratic parties in favor of a period of
Republican dominance that is sometimes referred to as the fourth party system.90

84

See MASHAW, supra note 8, at 177–78.
Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 101 (1972) (“What emerges
from this historical evolution is recognition that in America, as earlier in England, qui tam proceedings began as
a useful and perhaps necessary supplement to the efforts at law enforcement of inadequate public agencies. As
the public agencies became more effective [during the latter part of the nineteenth century], the need for qui tam
actions diminished.”).
86
The intervening Civil War and Reconstruction were perhaps the most important remaking of American
politics, and they both had transformative effects on the administrative state. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 81 (1991) (presenting the Civil War and the subsequent work of the
Reconstruction Republicans as a constitutional moment). Control of the White House changed four times during
this period. In addition, there were two elections in which the popular vote winner did not prevail in the Electoral
College. See Woolley, supra note 83. This was driven by Democrats’ ability to attract new immigrants to their
party. See MASHAW, supra note 8, at 229.
87
MASHAW, supra note 8, at 233, 241–42. This period is also the starting point for Skowronek’s review
of administrative state building. See generally SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 39–45.
88
MASHAW, supra note 8, at 239.
89
Id. at 243, 257–58 (providing an example involving military pensions).
90
See James E. Campbell, Party Systems and Realignments in the United States, 1868–2004, 30 SOC.
SCI. HIST. 359, 380 (2006) (finding that 1896 reflected a realignment of political power towards Republicans at
the presidential and congressional levels).
85
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For three decades, the Republicans retained a near lock on the White House, as
well as control over both houses of Congress.91 The Democratic party of the time
was largely relegated to regional status, where it dominated in the Jim Crow
South.92 With a largely free hand to shape national policy, the Republicans
pursued an incongruous mix of laissez-faire economic policies, concessions to
the growing labor movement, and Progressive Era initiatives that included
prohibition, trust-busting, and political reform.93
Changes to administrative law and practice accompanied, and to some
degree preceded, these political shifts.94 The Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) was established roughly a decade before the McKinley wave election,
creating a new paradigm for governmental organization.95 The Pendleton Civil
Service Reform Act, which established the merit-based civil service system that
ultimately eliminated the spoils system at the federal level, was adopted only a
few years earlier.96 The Sherman Antitrust Act, the first major competition law
at the federal level, was adopted in 1890.97 In the ensuing years, it was the
91
Republican Party, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Republican-Party
(last visited Aug. 12, 2019). The only deviation during this period was the election of Democrat Woodrow
Wilson, who won with 42% over a fractured Republican field featuring a third-party challenge from Teddy
Roosevelt’s Progressive Party, which finished second. United States Presidential Election Results,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-States-Presidential-Election-Results1788863 (last visited Aug. 17, 2019). The only real interruption of congressional control came during World
War I, after which Republicans once again gained control of Congress in the fourteen years leading up to the
Great Depression. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES:
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (last
visited Aug. 17, 2019).
92
See R. HAL WILLIAMS, REALIGNING AMERICA: WILLIAMS, BRYAN, AND THE REMARKABLE ELECTION
OF 1896, 11 (2010).
93
See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historic Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1216–29
(1986).
94
For an important overview of bureaucrat development of the time, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE
FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES 1862–1928, 7 (2001). For other foundational work, see SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 39–45.
95
The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act is often seen as the start of “traditional” administrative
law. See Stephen SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 121 (beginning his analysis with 1877 with a discussion of the
Interstate Commerce Act); see also Rabin, supra note 93, at 1189 (“[W]hen Congress established the Interstate
Commerce Commission, it initiated a new epoch in responsibilities of federal government. For the first time, a
national legislative scheme was enacted that provided for wide-ranging regulatory controls over an industry that
was vital to the nation’s economy—the railroads.”). The Act itself was new in how it “defines the structural
position of administrative agencies within the governmental system, specifies the decisional procedures those
agencies must follow, and determines the availability and scope of review of their actions by the independent
judiciary.” Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438
(2003).
96
27 Stat. 403 (1883). The growing concerns regarding excess by public servants led to a shift away from
bounties and towards official salaries as well. See NICHOLAS PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE
SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1780–1940, 17 (2013).
97
26 Stat. 209 (1890).
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dominant Republicans that administered these laws, translating the general
statutory directives into policies.
The administrative style during the fourth party system was markedly
different than the Jacksonian or postbellum period. Broader cultural trends
enhanced the legitimacy of experts, a position starkly at odds with Jackson’s
populism.98 Coupled with civil service protections meant to root out the
patronage networks that had supported the earlier political system, the result was
a professionalized federal bureaucracy that was relatively insulated from
electoral politics.99 The laissez-faire ideology and business constituency of the
dominant Republicans, however, meant that direct regulation was largely
disfavored, with courts continuing to play a central role—the Sherman Act’s
private cause of action and criminal enforcement is perhaps the paradigmatic
instance of this court-centric approach.100 Even when bolder regulatory action
was taken during this period, such as through the passage of the Pure Food and
Drug Act, the resulting law was often friendly to industrial interests that saw the
law as a stabilizing force for business.101
The administrative system between the Civil War and the New Deal was a
time of deep transition. There is some disagreement over whether this change
was a fundamental break with the past, as Skowronek argues,102 or simply the
further development of existing administrative capacities.103 What is clearer,
however, is that many features of our modern administrative law—direct judicial
review of agency action, independent regulators, and broad support for agency
expertise—grew more prominent as the federal government expanded. In doing
so, these features of the regulatory state were responding to a political movement
that was supportive of broad national policymaking to address health, safety, and
economic issues, but that was still skeptical of a fully administrative model.104

98

SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 175.
RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEMS
OF BUREAUCRACY 12 (1994) (“[I]n the late nineteenth century, with the enthusiastic support of the president
Congress voted to restrict the number of patronage positions that were available. With the enactment of the
Pendleton Act (22 Stat. 403) on 16 January 1883, the process was established by which patronage was to give
way gradually to merit-based employment. By 1904, only twenty-one years after the Pendleton Act was passed,
over 50 percent of the total federal civilian labor force was under merit provisions.”).
100
Rabin, supra note 93, at 1216–18.
101
Id. at 1224–26.
102
SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 285–87 (describing the period as one of “Modern American statebuilding”). To Skowronek, the system that emerged in this period was in direct contrast to the prior “state of
courts and parties,” supported by “an intellectual vanguard” that “articulated the limitations” of the old system.
Id. at 286.
103
See MASHAW, supra note 8, at 4–9.
104
Rabin, supra note 93, at 1219–20 (summarizing the competing view of Progressive Era and concluding
99
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The New Deal is the most widely recognized period when political
transformation resulted in a radically altered administrative landscape. After the
landslide election of 1932, and in the midst of the crisis of the Great Depression,
an electoral majority existed unlike any other in modern politics: From 1932–
1938, Democrats never held fewer than 59 Senate seats or 313 House seats.105
Most critically, these partisan advantages were so great that a single part of the
Democratic coalition, the more liberal Northern Democrats, constituted an
absolute majority on its own.106 The result of this partisan asymmetry was a
flurry of legislative activity, including both temporary responses to the Great
Depression and lasting legislation like the Social Security Act.107 Political
priorities, moreover, were set from the top, with the President clearly pushing a
platform and controlling the party.108 In short, this six-year period featured a
powerful executive at the head of a powerful party that held, essentially,
unchecked power over the political branches.
These political incentives led to substantial changes to the administrative
state, both in its size and its authority. Administrative agencies were created,
both to manage the new regulatory programs and to directly provide sources of
federal employment.109 Legal constraints on the administrative state were also
greatly reduced, allowing for unprecedented congressional innovation. After
initial setbacks, the Supreme Court soon approved of both broad delegations of

that “neither position anticipated government intervention of the kind that was to result from the New Deal
perception of wholesale market malfunction”).
105
SHAFER, supra note 13, at 7.
106
Id. at 6 (noting that the “elections of 1934 and 1936 were to be the only ones in American history in
which Northern Democrats constituted a majority of the House of Representatives”).
107
Legislation from the first hundred days included the Federal Securities Act, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat.
74 (1933); Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933); Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No
73-66, 48 Stat. 612 (1933) (Glass-Steagall is part of the broader U.S.A. Banking Act); and the National Industrial
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). The second wave of legislation included the Banking Act
of 1935 and the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). For a general discussion of these
two waves, see SHAFER, supra note 13, at 12, 16 (collecting legislation).
108
Almost all of these legislative initiatives began in the White House itself, rather than in the
congressional committees. Id. at 16.
109
Agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) exemplify how these two aims coexisted. Created
as a public corporation at the start of the New Deal program in 1933, the TVA pursued an agenda of improving
resource management along the Tennessee River and Mississippi River Basins, while also serving as a source
of short-term jobs for millions of unemployed Americans. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, Pub. L. No. 73-17
(1933). Much like Jackson’s spoils system or civil service system of the 1870s, federal administrative
employment itself once again became a forum for policymaking, not just a means to an end.
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powers to agencies110 and broad assertions of power under Article I.111 At no
point during this period did the Court invalidate delegations to the New Deal
agencies,112 despite the fact that some of these delegations were incredibly
broad.113 The Court also limited the reach of substantive due process as a
restriction on economic regulation.114 Just as American politics demanded
unprecedented national legislation to tackle the depression, the legal constraints
on those actions—whether through powers (Commerce Clause), rights
(substantive due process), or structure (non-delegation)—gave way.115
At the same time that the structure of party politics provided the Roosevelt
Administration with unprecedented scope, the build-out of the administrative
state was used purposefully by Roosevelt to undercut the importance of
traditional parties, in particular by substituting agencies and formal programs for
party patronage as the primary method for distributing state benefits.116

110
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (discussing the history of the nondelegation doctrine before and after 1935). In 1935, the Court had invalidated two provisions on non-delegation
grounds. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529, 542 (1935) (invalidating a
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act allowing the president to designate “codes of fair
competition”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–20 (1935) (invalidating a provision of the
National Industrial Recovery Act that authorized the President to prohibit petroleum commerce).
111
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43
(1937).
112
Kagan, supra note 3, at 2365–66 (noting that the two statutes invalidated on non-delegation grounds
involved delegations directly to the President).
113
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1677.
114
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). While this moment is frequently framed
in “external terms,” as the Court responding to political pressure, Barry Cushman has offered an “internal”
account, relying on the “legal intellectual dimension” of the shift in doctrine. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking
the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 207 (1994).
115
These changes were supported in a new scholarly movement in favor of expert regulation, reflected in
James Landis’ Administrative Process, published in 1938. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
(1938). Defending the administrative state against its detractors, Landis argued that the new administrative
process was a superior means of exercising both judicial and legislative functions and offered a way to
“modernize” the separation of powers. This view was particularly skeptical of the courts, with Landis noting
that “judicial review over administrative action gives a sense of battle” leading courts to “thwart the effects of
legislative judgments ... under the guise of constitutional and statutory interpretation.” James Landis,
Administrative Policies and the Courts, 47 YALE L.J. 519, 519 (1937). His explanation for why administrative
agencies were superior to courts not only included the familiar description of expertise and practicality, but also
an assault on the “judicial conservatism” that was, in his account, ill-suited to the demands of the modern
economy. James Landis, The Place of Administrative Law, 13 CONN. BAR J. 71, 72–77 (1939). The new
administrative state was also buoyed by legal doctrine, developed during the New Deal period, that allowed for
statutory independence from presidential control. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).
116
SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL 149–161 (1993).
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After the high-water mark of the New Deal, the politics of the subsequent
three decades largely entrenched the existing policy program, while making
concessions to opposition interests when necessary. From 1940 to 1968, the
Democrats sustained congressional majorities for all but a few years and won
five out of seven presidential elections. But the margins were much closer, and
internal division within the Democratic Party over civil rights created frequent
opportunities for cross-party coalitions: Congressional voting during the time is
markedly nonpartisan when compared to later periods.117 Accommodation to
interests unhappy with the New Deal program and the administrative apparatus
that accompanied it became necessary. Administrative law again shifted to
account for this new political dynamic, most importantly with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed in 1946.118
Under the understanding of the politics/administration dichotomy popular at
the time, agencies served as a “transmission belt” for legislative policy.119
Concerns that agencies under presidential control might malfunction in that role
were addressed through judicial review, which ensured that agencies were acting
within their appropriate delegation of authority and not infringing upon
individual private rights in the process.120 More probing judicial review, and in
particular review on behalf of regulatory beneficiaries, might well have seemed
unnecessary when the nation was still governed by a dominant single party, the
prospect of regulatory legislation was relatively high, and the agencies could
fairly be understood as an extension of the legislature.
As these examples demonstrate, administrative law adjusts to surrounding
political forces through both doctrinal change and the development of new
institutional arrangements. These illustrations are far from complete, but they do
illuminate a system of administrative control that is highly contextual. The
institutions that comprise this system—courts, agencies, and elected officials—
are versatile, adjusting their role in administration to new political incentives.
This adaptability does not make good administration inevitable, but it does
suggest that there is potential for responsive change.
Our discussion of the first two centuries of American administration was
abbreviated, but starting in 1968 it becomes necessary to slow things down. The

117
See Harry J. Enten, Were Republicans Really the Party of Civil Rights in the 1960s?, GUARDIAN (Aug.
28, 2013, 9:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/28/republicans-party-of-civilrights (documenting the regional, rather than partisan, difference in the vote).
118
Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
119
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1684.
120
Id. at 1761–76.
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political changes that followed the late New Deal era would bring about a
complete overhaul in administrative law. Since the doctrines that arose from this
period are the doctrines we still live with today, a more thorough examination
of the period is needed.
C. The Last Era of Administrative Law, 1969–1992
Richard Nixon’s election in 1968 ushered in a new structure to U.S. party
politics. The era of Democratic domination was over, and Republicans would
hold the White House (with the limited exception of Jimmy Carter’s one term)
for over two decades. Republican dominance was not complete, however,
because the Democrats maintained majorities in Congress, and especially the
House.121 Thus, the characteristic feature of this period was divided government,
with the Democrats controlling the legislature and the Republicans controlling
the White House. This was also a time of realignment in the ideological direction
of the parties, with the ascendance of the conservative wing of the Republican
Party and the decline of labor in the Democratic Party, leading to an increase in
polarization and a shift in the substantive cleavage on issues that separated the
parties.122
Changes in the organization of politics resulted in shifts in administrative
law during this time that can be roughly divided into two periods: a reformation
period that was characterized by an expansion of judicial oversight of
administrative decision making, followed by a presidentialization period
characterized by the increasingly successful imposition of presidential authority
over agencies.123 By the end of these two waves of reform, the system of
administrative law that is familiar today was in place.

121
SHAFER, supra note 13, at 72–74. Writing at the time, Morris Fiorina argued that this pattern of
consistent divided government signaled that the idea of realignment was “a dead concept.” See Morris P. Fiorina,
An Era of Divided Government, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 324 (G. Peele et al. eds., 1992). He
also noted that the era from 1968 to 1988 was a historical outlier for the prevalence of divided government. Id.
at 325–26.
122
See LAWRENCE C. DODD & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 94–97 figs.4-4 to 4-8
(11th ed. 2016) (empirically demonstrating increased polarization throughout the period and noting that “survey
data confirm that the congressional parties represent increasingly distinctive sets of voters.”); SHAFER, supra
note 13, at 94–98 (describing the increased ideological polarization of party activists).
123
See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing justifications for growth of presidential power over agencies); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U.
KAN. L. REV. 689, 707 (2000) (“Reformers ... seek[ing] to combat government failure ... initially chose
presidential oversight as the principal procedural vehicle for reform, and the Reagan and Bush Administrations
put these plans into effect.”).
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The advent of divided government did not spell the end of legislative
productivity, and bipartisan legislation was common.124 From the perspective of
federal administration, however, this political dynamic created a complication.
Many of the regulatory statutes, passed during the New Deal or pushed by liberal
members of Congress, were now being administered almost exclusively by
Republicans.125 Allegations of agencies “captured” by industry abounded, both
from the outside and in the courts.126 To many on the left, the broad discretion
asserted during the New Deal era, expressed in guidance like the Attorney
General’s Manual,127 looked less attractive when exercised by presidents less
committed to the statutes’ regulatory objectives. This was the backdrop for the
fundamental transformation of the 1960s and 1970s, famously dubbed by
Professor Stewart as “the reformation of American administrative law.”128
The reformation was characterized by a rethinking of the role of judicial
review.129 In rough strokes, during the long New Deal period, a (largely)
124
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596 (1970), passed with 83 votes
in the Senate (35 of them Republican) and 310 votes in the House (138 of them Republican). See Votes to Pass
S. 2193 (91st Congress), GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/91-1970/s599 (last visited Aug.
12, 2019) (showing the vote count in the Senate); Votes to Adopt the Conference Report on S. 2193 (91st
Congress), GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/91-1970/h419 (last visited Aug. 12, 2019). The
Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (1972) was passed by bipartisan majorities following a veto by President
Nixon. See Clean Water: Congress Overrides Presidential Veto, in CQ ALMANAC1972, at 11–17 (28th ed.
1973). Scholars of the period were struck with how divided government did not seem to undermine effectiveness.
See generally MAYHEW, supra note 51 (arguing that divided government was an effective system for developing
public policy). The effectiveness of divided government during this period came from its stability. As Shafer put
it, “cross-partisan and cross-institutional negotiations ... characterize[d] the policymaking process of the era of
divided government [because the] particular and recurrent institutional split implied that the two parties could
not hope to be rescued electorally, at least in the short run.” SHAFER, supra note 13, at 104. The era of partisan
volatility created very different incentives, a point we return to below.
125
See supra SCHAFER note 13, at 72–74.
126
See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043
(1996) (“There was during the period [1967 to 1983] no loss of faith in activist government. But a key
instrumentality of activist government—the administrative agency—came to be regarded as suffering from
pathologies not shared by other governmental institutions such as legislatures or courts. The principal pathology
emphasized during these years was ‘capture,’ meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible
to domination by the industry they were charged with regulating.”); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
127
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
(1947). The manual was understood as embodying a hands-off role for the federal courts. Professor John Duffy
described the manual as “a highly political document designed to minimize the impact of the new statute on
executive agencies, shrewdly characterized the APA provisions governing judicial review as merely a
‘restatement’ and thereby invited courts and the bar to treat the Act as something less than a statute, as
subservient to judge-made doctrine.” John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 113, 119 (1998).
128
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1669.
129
This rethinking of the judicial role often played out in disagreements among the justices. In Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, for instance, a majority of Court adopted a view of ripeness that allowed more private
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Democratic administration was carrying out the policy program of a Democratic
legislature, and the role of judicial review was to accommodate negatively
affected interests, who were represented by the weak but not entirely
marginalized Republicans. Once the Republican Party took over the White
House, this dynamic shifted dramatically, drawing attention to the importance
of discretion under vague and open-ended statutes.130 Judges appointed during
the long New Deal began to see the purely negative program of the prior model
as inadequate. Instead, courts expanded their role to warding against agencies
that failed to “affirmatively carry out the legislative mandates.”131 The court
most closely associated with the reformation program was the D.C. Circuit.132
Components of the reformation included relaxed standing requirements as well
as new procedural and substantive requirements that were placed on agency
rulemaking.133
In tandem with reformation in the courts, the President and Congress were
also taking steps to accommodate themselves to the new reality. A shift in the
challenges to agency action. See 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (finding that agency action could be ripe for judicial
review prior to enforcement). Justice Fortas, long a political supporter of the New Deal Democratic Party,
disagreed, advocating for adherence to the traditional view. See Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 167,
175 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the holding in Abbott
Laboratories and noting “that established principles of jurisprudence, solidly rooted in the constitutional
structure of our Government, require that the courts should not intervene in the administrative process at this
stage ....”).
130
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1683 (“[T]he exercise of agency discretion is inevitably seen as the essentially
legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests affected by agency policy.”).
131
Id. at 1682.
132
See, e.g., Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Its supervisory
function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the
mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination
of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasons decision-making.”). Gary Lawson’s administrative law casebook provides a colorful account
of this period on the D.C. Circuit; see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 357 & nn.28–31 (7th ed.
2016).
133
See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (requiring that
agencies make available information that was relied on during the rulemaking as part of “hard look” review);
Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting that judicial review ensures
“major issues of policy were ventilated” during rulemaking process); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding that parties had standing to sue because of their recreational interest
in “the conservation of natural resources”). For a discussion of the expansion of standing throughout this period,
see generally Stewart, supra note 2, at 1723–48. For a thorough description of the debate on the D.C. Circuit at
the time, see generally Reuel Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139 (2001). Whether expanding judicial review along these lines actually
helped regulatory beneficiaries is a separate empirical question. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact
of Judicial Review of Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1789
(2012) (concluding that judicial review is less influential than generally expected in the administrative law
context); Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93
TEX. L. REV. 625, 645–49 (2015) (discussing ways in which deference regimes may favor regulated industry).
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substantive focus on federal policy from sector-oriented economic regulation
(e.g., ratemaking) to economy-wide substantive regulation on matters such as
workplace safety or environmental protection encouraged the substitution of
informal notice-and-comment rulemaking for case-by-case adjudication and
formal rulemaking, which were too cumbersome for the new regulatory
program.134 The new, more flexible style of rulemaking, along with the
expanded delegated authority of the new regulatory statutes, placed substantial
policymaking power in the agencies. Responding to this fact, as well as the
reality that agencies were largely staffed with civil servants committed to the
prior regime’s policy program, the Nixon Administration embarked on an effort
to exert central influence over the bureaucracy, in part by building out the
presidential bureaucracy in the White House.135 Congress, responding to the new
partisan reality, engaged in the first major overhaul of administrative procedure
statutes, adding procedural, analytic, and transparency requirements through
legislation such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.136
The election of Ronald Reagan marked a shift from the reformation period
of accommodation with the old order to the presidentialization period that
constructed the current edifice of administrative law. Reagan expanded on the
earlier steps of the Nixon administration to exert control over agencies in a
variety of ways. One of the most important changes was the centralization of
control over the appointments process.137 This centralization helped select
appointees who were loyal to the more conservative-oriented policy program of
the new administration—it was not enough to be a Republican; the
Administration wanted to screen for Reaganites.138 A second innovation was a

134
See Paul Verkuil, Judicial Review and Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 186 (1974)
(“Rulemaking is unique to the administrative process. And properly applied it represents the ultimate form of
that process. Even though some adjudication occurs in the administrative decisionmaking model, the role
assigned to administrative agencies is in many ways different from that assigned the judicial. Administrative
agencies frequently must act prospectively to plan, organize, and set standards. The legislative branch recognizes
these functions by accompanying most agencies’ mandates with grants of rulemaking power.”).
135
See RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 34–42 (1983) (describing the Nixon
Administration’s increase of staff within the White House); see also Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The
Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2011)
(chronicling the evolution of regulatory review).
136
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app.
(2012); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
137
Donald P. Moynihan & Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph of Loyalty Over Competence: The Bush
Administration and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 572, 573 (2010).
138
See THOMAS J. WEKO, THE POLITICIZING PRESIDENCY: THE WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL OFFICE, 1948–
1994, 96–97 (1995) (noting the importance of the screening process and of the appointees’ political beliefs).
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substantial expansion of executive review of regulatory proposals.139 Under
Reagan’s executive order 12,291, the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) was charged with reviewing all new regulations that were issued
by executive agencies against a cost-benefit standard as well as the President’s
substantive priorities, which included a program of deregulation aimed
especially at New Deal industrial planning, but with a secondary focus on the
expanded economic regulation program initiated under Nixon.
Congress understood that the Reagan expansion of presidential power would
come at the expense of congressional influence over administrative agencies,
and it took several steps to resist these changes, including:
hyper-detailed substantive statutory amendments; the imposition of
rulemaking deadlines, regulatory hammers, and similar statutory
action-forcing mandates; the increase in reports and other oversight
data that agencies are required to give Congress; the refusal to confirm
nominees to key White House oversight positions; and the use of riders
in appropriations bills to regain control over specific agency
programs.140

Conflict over OIRA lasted through the Reagan Administration and eventually
led to the refusal of Congress to confirm any administrator to OIRA during the
George H.W. Bush Administration.141
The gradual replacement of judges from the New Deal era by Nixon’s
appointees also led to a rethinking of the role of the courts in overseeing
administrative action.142 In Vermont Yankee v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist (a Nixon appointee)
sharply upbraided the D.C. Circuit for expanding procedural requirements to the
point of the “Kafkaesque.”143 Although that decision did not immediately lead
139
Some form of regulatory review had been in place since Nixon, but Reagan substantially expanded the
substantive and institutional strength of this requirement. Office of Mgm’t & Budget, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Q&A’s, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
OIRA_QsandAs (“The issuance of Presidential regulatory principles, and the centralized review of draft
regulations, has been an accepted part of regulatory development for 30 years in one form or another. This began
with President Nixon’s ‘Quality of Life’ program, and continued in the 1970s with President Ford’s requirement
in Executive Orders 11821 and 11949 for agencies to prepare inflation/economic impact statements and with
President Carter’s Executive Order 12044 on ‘Improving Government Regulations.’”).
140
Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 227, 235 (1998).
141
See James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and
Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 855 (2001).
142
See generally Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718 (1986)
(discussing the changing makeup of the court and its emerging practices and jurisprudence).
143
See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 557 (1978).
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to a reverse course on the lower courts,144 the era of ever-increasing judicial
management of the administrative process had come to an end.145 In Heckler v.
Chaney, the Court found an agency’s enforcement authority to be all but
unreviewable, another important protection for presidential prerogative.146 The
Court also released other external checks on presidential authority in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,147 which struck down the
legislative veto as unconstitutional while maintaining the broad delegations of
authority to agencies in related statutes, a breathtaking transfer of authority to
the executive.148
Two other foundational cases for contemporary administrative law are
Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm and Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.149 Much (arguably too much) has been
written about these two cases, so our discussion will be brief. Although Chevron
marked an important expansion of authority by the executive, it also drew a line,
with the Court preserving the function of the judiciary in ensuring the legality of
agency action by enforcing unambiguous congressional commands.150 This
accommodation to the continued power of Congress, and the institutional
function of courts, marked an outer boundary of the President’s new authority.
State Farm played a similar role. Although Vermont Yankee was meant to reel
in the lower court’s imposition of procedural requirements on agencies, the
144
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 669, 673, 683 (2005) (noting
practice of the First Circuit to maintain precedents eroded by Vermont Yankee).
145
See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Fed. Aviation Ass’n, 169 F.3d 1, 7 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(suggesting that prior ex-parte limitation was undermined by Vermont Yankee); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to extend prior decision limiting ex-parte communications in agency
decision making);
146
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985). See generally Cary Coglianese & Christopher S.
Yoo, Introduction: The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1594
(2016) (discussing importance of the “power to defer”).
147
462 U.S. 919, 955–59 (1983).
148
See E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the
Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. L. REV. 125, 126 (1983) (describing the decision in Chadha as a “shock”
following the courts’ prior balancing approach to the separation of powers); cf. Richard I. Goldsmith, INS. v.
Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A Speculation, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 749, 750–51 (1984) (wrongly
predicting that the decision in Chadha would lead to subsequent development of the non-delegation doctrine).
Although the initial decision shifted power to the executive, dynamically the elimination of the legislative veto
may, paradoxically, have led to an increasingly assertive legislature, ultimately canceling out the executiveenhancing nature of the decision. See Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1154 (2014) (drawing lessons from history of the legislative veto at the state level).
149
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). By way of illustration, State Farm has
been cited more than 700 times by the D.C. Circuit alone, while Chevron has nearly 1,400 citations by the
Circuit.
150
Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
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Court in State Farm reaffirmed the judiciary’s central role in ensuring regularity
with the core administrative value of reasoned decision-making.
When Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in 1993, he inherited the
administrative law and institutions that had been forged over the past sixty years.
Clinton’s election marked a return to unified Democratic control over the
political branches. Like Carter before him, Clinton embraced a more centrist
platform, placing him somewhat at odds with the older-style Democrats in
Congress.151 At the time, it was not clear whether Clinton’s victory presaged a
return to Democratic dominance, or would be a Carter-style blip in the politics
of divided government that had reigned since 1969.152 The reality that Clinton’s
election would usher in a new stage of wildly swinging party control and
increasingly deep ideological divides was much less anticipated. As Clinton and
his successors in the presidency, as well as courts and Congress, responded to
the new reality, they left much of the administrative apparatus in place, turning
doctrine and institutions to new ends. This syncretic approach functioned
reasonably well for a time, creating channels that translated electoral preferences
into policy outcomes while protecting administrative values of stability and
expertise. But, as we will discuss in the following Part, this system of turning
the old system to new purposes may have reached a breaking point.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF PARTISAN VOLATILITY
The current party system has two dominant features: polarization and
volatility. The first feature leads to party coalitions that are further away from
one another (and the median voter). As the parties drift further apart,
opportunities to act in periods of divided government shrink. Executive actions
replace legislation as the means of moving a policy program forward and
Congress shifts its focus toward oversight and investigations. Current parties are
more decentralized, with less of a role for party leadership. As a result,
polarization leads to both more extreme outcomes and more isolated centers of
decision-making, as issue advocates are given the reins to manage different areas
151
See Jon F. Hale, The Making of the New Democrats, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 207, 207 (1995) (“Clinton did
not want to be regarded as a Democrat in the line of Michael Dukakis, Walter Mondale, Jimmy Carter, and
George McGovern. The New Democrat rhetoric, however, was not simply campaign rhetoric concocted by
Clinton’s coterie of talented campaign strategists. It stood for a substantively new Democratic approach to active
government that had been developing since the early years of the Reagan administration.”).
152
Compare Everett Carll Ladd, The 1992 Vote for President Clinton: Another Brittle Mandate?, 108 POL.
SCI. Q. 1, 1–2 (1993) (arguing that the 1992 election was a deviation, but not a realignment, noting that “little
happen[ed] in the mix of party identification”), with Robin Toner, 1992 Elections: At Dawn of New Politics,
Challenges for Both Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B1 (citing democratic sources who believed that the
Republicans “‘electoral lock’ on the White House was ‘broken forever’”).
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of policy. The second feature, volatility, leads to frequent and consistent swings
in control of government. Periods of unified government quickly yield to long
stretches of divided government, followed by electoral success for the out party
in the next open presidential election. This predictable pattern incentivizes
obstruction over cooperation, as the party opposed to the executive can simply
wait for a future election to enact its agenda. Taken together, these two
characteristics lead to swings between radically different policy positions. The
result is a political system where policy reversals are common, Congress is
unresponsive, and decision-making is less centralized.
This partisan volatility threatens effective administration. Good public
policy takes many years to develop and implement. A project started in one
administration may not produce results until the next. When the electoral results
were stable and polarization less extreme—as in the period from 1968 to 1992—
bipartisan policy had a chance of weathering intervening elections. The current
system instead creates a need for more short-term policy implementation, as
signature pieces of legislation do not have bipartisan support at the time they are
passed. Even if policies are not reversed outright, they are often weakened or
ignored by the other party. For regulated communities, this back and forth results
in higher costs, as the investments made to satisfy one regulatory regime are
disregarded by the next. The constant concerns about the health of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges under Republican leadership are one
salient example of a more pervasive problem.153
Many institutions of administrative law have the potential to limit these
costs, either through promoting less extreme policy in the first instance or by
stabilizing implementation once a policy is adopted. The strength of these
institutions is all the more important as polarization and volatility become more
severe. In the Executive Branch, OIRA has historically helped to both centralize
the regulatory agenda and moderate policy. In Congress, agencies like the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), staffed with career
civil servants, inform the policy process through nonpartisan research and
consistent methodology. Finally, the courts themselves have played a role in
stabilizing policy through the development of doctrines to ensure procedural
rigor and substantive rationality in agency actions. Rather than remaining
153
See, e.g., LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., HOW WOULD COVERAGE, FEDERAL SPENDING, AND PRIVATE
PREMIUMS CHANGE IF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STOPPED REIMBURSING INSURERS FOR THE ACA’S COSTSHARING REDUCTIONS? 1–3 (2017) (discussing the implications of the Trump Administration’s decision
regarding reimbursements for ACA exchange insurers, one of the many issues over which the new Republican
administration departed from the prior administration in its implementation of the ACA).
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insulated from political pressure, however, these institutions are threatened by
the current system. In some cases, the same external forces that created increased
partisan polarization have reached the institutions designed to resist them, such
as the courts. For other actors, such as OIRA and CBO, their role has been
reduced and their input dismissed when they are seen as an obstacle to partisan
policy.
This Part discusses the current party system and its effect on administrative
institutions. Sections II.A and II.B describe the political conditions of extreme
polarization and volatility, respectively. Section II.C examines the effect of these
political forces on administrative institutions, finding that they threaten the
ability of stabilizing institutions to maintain reasoned decision-making.
A. Partisanship Without Parties
The era of partisan volatility began with the election of Bill Clinton in
1992.154 This election led to unified Democratic control of the federal
government. This dominance was short-lived, however, with Republicans taking
control of Congress in the wave election of 1994. This led to six years of divided
government, followed by unified Republican control in 2000 under President
George W. Bush. Much like his predecessor, however, divided government
followed, this time with a Republican President and a Democratic Congress. In
just sixteen years, the American electorate had selected different parties to
control the machinery of government in every possible combination. The result
was “a rapid succession of all four partisan possibilities” that “had not been seen
in American politics since the 1840s.”155 These trends continued during the
presidency of Barack Obama, who entered office with substantial majorities,
only to see the House change hands two years later and the Senate change hands
during his second term. Like his two predecessors, he also left office to a
President and Congress of the opposing party. For President Trump, the story
has been the same, with control of the House flipping in the first midterm.156
Rather than creating a party system characterized by stable actors, like the party
systems that came before it, the defining feature of this era is change itself, what
Byron Shafer calls “shifting mixes of absolutely everything.”157

154

SHAFER, supra note 13, at 121.
Id. at 122.
156
2018 Midterm Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2018/us/elections/calendar-primary-results.html.
157
SHAFER, supra note 13, at 122.
155
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Changes in party control of government are only half of the partisanship
story. The other is the increased ideological distance between the parties
themselves. Many observers have noted the increasingly polarized Congress, as
the moderating forces of Northeastern Republicans and Southern Democrats
collapsed.158 Moreover, party activists, once kept in check by more moderate
party elites, began to take control of elected officials, further exacerbating the
divide.159 As this extremism came to define Congress itself, major legislation
(now adopted almost exclusively during united government) has passed without
bipartisan support. This trend has worsened since 1992, with the “truly amazing
incarnations of an exaggerated partisan outline” during the Obama years.160
Since the start of the Bush Administration, instances of presidents aligning with
the opposition party have been rare, and often in the face of financial crisis,
wherein both actors had to come to the table, such as during the financial crisis
of 2008 or the fiscal cliffs of 2011 and 2012.161
A shift in parties themselves has accompanied the shift in partisanship.
Political parties function as both an identity for voters and an independent
organization, managed by its elite members.162 While partisanship affiliations
have grown more prominent as an electoral force, the role of the parties as a
system of organization and discipline has declined.163 For much of the twentieth

158
See, e.g., Robin Toner, Southern Democrats’ Decline is Eroding the Political Center, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/15/politics/southern-democrats-decline-is-eroding-the-politicalcenter.html.
159
SHAFER, supra note 13, at 141 (“[I]n … the Era of Partisan Volatility, the ideological dynamic that had
captured the activist stratum in both parties broke through the previous firewall, capturing elected officialdom
and fostering generalized polarization.”).
160
Id. at 159. For instance, the ACA received zero Republican votes in either chamber, while the Trump
Administration’s signature tax legislation received no Democratic votes.
161
Id. at 160–61; see AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL
POLARIZATION xxii (James E. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015) (listing as consensus views the
proposition that “[t]he parties in Congress are as polarized … as at any time in history,” “[t]he fit between
ideology and party is unusually strong,” and “[u]nder divided government and split chamber control, the current
Congress has ceased to operate as an effective legislative body.”). The pieces in this collection go on to explore
particular factors reinforcing this polarization, like changes to the media and political redistricting. See, e.g.,
Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, Redistricting and Polarization, in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES,
CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 45 (James E. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015).
162
See HERSHEY, supra note 43, at 6; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224–
25 (1986) (recognizing associational rights of political parties as private associations); ALDRICH, supra note 43,
at 4–6 (adopting a more elite-driven and insider-driven understanding of political parties; DONALD GREEN ET
AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS 4 (2002) (“To
be sure, party issue positions have something to do with the attractiveness of partisan labels …. But causality
also flows in the other direction: When people feel a sense of belonging to a given social group, they absorb the
doctrinal positions the group advocates.”
163
See Julia Azari, Weak Parties and Strong Partisanship are a Bad Combination, VOX (Nov. 3, 2016,
4:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/11/3/13512362/weak-parties-strong-partisanship-
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century, party elites controlled the party nomination process, especially at the
national level.164 Despite reforms that attempted to wrest control from insiders
and broaden the nomination process, highly involved party activists were able
to work within the party system to both direct campaign resources and control
messaging, therefore guaranteeing the success of insider candidates.165 As
recently as the 2000 election, insider favorites were able to defeat outside
candidates, even those with popular positions and biographies.166 When “the
party decides,” the real presidential contest is not for primary votes, but instead
for the high profile endorsements that dominate the “invisible primary.”167
If the nomination of Barack Obama over Hillary Clinton suggested a
deviation from the model, the nomination of Donald Trump as the Republican
nominee eight years later was a full-scale repudiation. Trump is the only
President since at least 1980 to have fewer endorsements than another primary
candidate and win the nomination.168 While it is too soon to know whether this
is just another aberration, the inability of Republican elites to control the
nomination process has coincided with other forces that suggest a declining role
for party elites. A variety of legal changes, as well as changes in the practices of
political donors, have reduced the influence of the official party apparatus.169 At
least anecdotally, this has contributed to a string of upsets in party nominations
in recent years on the Republican side170 and conflicts between donors and party
leaders.171
These two trends produce a paradoxical result. Ideological separation is
more pronounced than ever, while the parties themselves retain less control. The
interaction between strong partisans and weak parties has gained attention
bad-combination.
164
MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER
REFORM 7 (2008).
165
Id. This work defines political parties in a broad way, arguing that the highly involved activists function
as a single political party, even without formal affiliations with the national organization.
166
Id. at 5–6.
167
See id. at 5, 187–88.
168
See Harry Enten, The Four Things I Learned from the Donald Trump Primary, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(May 6, 2016, 4:55 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-four-things-i-learned-from-the-donald-trumpprimary/.
169
Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover of Our Hollowed-Out Political
Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845, 862–64 (2017) (summarizing the Court’s decisions in FEC v. Colo. Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 455 (2001) and Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado Republican I), 518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996)).
170
Examples include Christine O’Donnell, Ken Buck, Roy Moore, and Todd Akin.
171
See, e.g., Edward-Isaac Dovere, Why Tom Steyer Doesn’t Care What Nancy Pelosi Thinks, POLITICO
(May 29, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/29/trump-impeachment-democrats-steyerpelosi-218548.
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following the 2016 election.172 The critiques have focused on how these two
features of the current political climate change the policymaking process, noting
the declining importance of political norms.173 These same features also have an
impact on administration. When parties are operating effectively, they help
aggregate policy preferences, determine priorities, and push a unified policy
agenda.174 For the White House, these same forces lead to centralized decisionmaking. As the parties have declined in their ability to exercise these functions,
the traditional tools of managing the administrative state, both in the Legislative
and the Executive Branches, have changed with it.
As discussed above, the era of divided government was characterized by the
exertion of greater control over regulatory policy by Republican Presidents,
including through the establishment and growth of OIRA. OIRA review
procedures served a gatekeeping function for federal regulation, helping to
ensure substantive outcomes favored by the Republican-dominated White
House.175 In the agencies themselves, personnel selection was heavily
influenced by partisan affiliation, leading to posts filled by Republican Party
loyalists who reflected the priorities of the national organization.176
During much of the era of partisan volatility, presidential control of the
administrative state accelerated. The structures that facilitated greater control by
Republican presidents during the era of divided government were relatively
easily repurposed for use by both Democratic and Republican presidents in the
early years of partisan volatility.177 In addition, like their predecessors during
the era of divided government, the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama
Administrations used both personnel decisions and regulatory review in ways
that broadly promoted the consensus agenda of the respective parties.178 This
reflected the posture of each President as broadly representative of elites within
their respective parties. Even President Obama, whose 2008 Democratic primary
victory upset longstanding norms of elite party control over the nomination
172
See Julia Azari, Weak Parties and Strong Partisanship Are a Bad Combination, VOX (Nov. 3, 2016,
4:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/11/3/13512362/weak-parties-strong-partisanshipbad-combination.
173
See id. (focusing on the collapse of political norms that results from weak institutional parties); see
also ISSACHAROFF, supra note 169, at 879–80.
174
HERSHEY, supra note 43, at 11–12. See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (2d ed. 2007).
175
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 21–30 (2008).
176
See, e.g., DEVINS & LEWIS, supra note 36, at 480–83 (describing the growth in the nomination of party
loyalists to independent agency positions since the 1980s).
177
See Kagan, supra note 3, at 2249–50.
178
See Livermore, supra note 3, at 73–80.
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process, nevertheless governed as a party moderate, relying heavily on
appointees with deep connections to the party establishment, and adopting a
policy agenda that fell well within the norms of the Democratic Party.179
The current Administration has struck a different path, although it is too soon
to know whether this is part of a larger trend. Two important differences stand
out. The first is the lack of a coherent policy agenda that reflects the consensus
view of party elites.180 Trump’s political appeal was built on a record outside of
traditional politics, and he did not develop particularly robust policy proposals
during the campaign. The policy platform he did enunciate deviated from
preexisting Republican orthodoxy in many areas, most markedly on trade and
national security.181 On immigration, arguably President Trump’s signature
issue, his policy views took a harder line than the one favored by Republican
Party elites. It may be that this departure from the party establishment fits into a
pattern where party elites have declining control over American politics.
The second difference is the breakdown of the coordinating and moderating
influence of the White House in favor of diffusion of authority to the political
leadership at agencies.182 The current Administration has had a great deal of
difficulty identifying competent long-term appointees for key White House
posts, and has been continually plagued by low-grade crises and shifts in
leadership.183 With less high-level coordination over policy priorities, the
political leadership of agencies have space to follow more idiosyncratic or
ideologically extreme agendas. For instance, the members of the Republican
coalition with a high level of interest in education policy pushed for Betsy

179

Id. at 91–92.
Cf. Lindsay McPherson, 2018 Republican Agenda Not What Lawmakers Envisioned, ROLL CALL (Feb.
5, 2018, 5:04 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/2018-republican-agenda-not-lawmakers-initiallyenvisioned (noting the role of intraparty disputes in limiting the legislative agenda).
181
Max Boot, Trump Security Strategy a Study in Contrasts, CFR (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/
expert-brief/trump-security-strategy-study-contrasts.
182
The diffusion of authority to political appointees at agencies has been accompanied by a sidelining of
civil service experts. Daniel A. Farber, Presidential Administration Under Trump 3–4 (Aug. 8, 2017)
(unpublished research paper) (on file with U.C. Berkeley School of Law), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015591
(“[R]ather than deferring to agency experts, the Administration has often cut them out of the loop and has shown
itself hostile in important ways to traditional forms of expertise.”)
183
See Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Record-Setting White House Staff Turnover Continues with News of
Counsel’s Departure, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/10/19/
record-setting-white-house-turnover-continues-with-news-of-counsels-departure/) (“Much like turnover within
the larger sample of senior White House staff, President Trump is breaking records.”); Kathryn Dunn Tenpas,
With the Revelation of Marc Short’s Impending Departure, President Trump Has Lost the Vast Majority of Tier
1 Staff Members, BROOKINGS INST. (June 27, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018 /06/27/trumphas-lost-the-vast-majority-of-tier-one-staff-members/ (describing record levels of turnover in the Trump
Administration for the twelve most senior positions within the White House).
180
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DeVos’s nomination to the Department of Education, despite her lacking
comparable experience to her predecessors.184 Similar stories could be told
regarding Scott Pruitt’s nomination at the EPA or Ryan Zinke’s leadership of
the Department of the Interior.185 Judicial appointments have seen a similar
trend, with outside groups playing a prominent role in Trump’s court
selections.186 Without a moderating central influence from the White House,
agency agendas have become more responsive to the most engaged (and likely
extreme) voices within the party coalition.187
Even when coordinated through powerful and coherent signals from the
White House, as they were during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama
Administrations, the dynamics of partisan volatility favored more aggressive use
of regulatory authority to achieve partisan policy goals. These same forces,
coupled with some features of the current Administration—including high
turnover of senior White House staff, the lack of a coordinated policy program,
greater skepticism towards agency expertise, and less reliance on traditional
experience in selecting personnel188—has unmoored decision-making from
stabilizing influences. If successful outsider candidates with few connections to
party institutions and little allegiance to party programs and governance
practices become the norm, then regulatory policymaking is likely to become
increasingly extreme.
B. Oscillating Control
Taken in isolation, a more polarized form of politics might not be
destabilizing on its own. If parties have unified and cohesive ideological
preferences, then pursuing these goals as a single party can lead to effective
results, so long as that party remains dominant.189 In a system like that of the
New Deal era, characterized by single-party dominance, increasing polarization
would not necessarily lead to uncertainty. The outcomes would be predictable,
184
Amber Phillips, That Confirmation Hearing, and Three Other Reasons Betsy DeVos’s Nomination Is
on the Rocks, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/02/thatconfirmation-hearing-and-3-other-reasons-betsy-devoss-nomination-is-on-the-rocks/?utm_term=.ae066a6face
9.
185
For a description of how decentralization can lead to greater ideological separation in the context of
congressional oversight, see Broker, supra note 39, at 270–73.
186
Leonard Leo, the Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society, served as President Trump’s
judicial adviser during both Supreme Court confirmations. See Jay Michaelson, The Secrets of Leonard Leo, the
Man Behind Trump’s Supreme Court Pick, DAILY BEAST (July 9, 2018, 5:16 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.
com/the-secrets-of-leonard-leo-the-man-behind-trumps-supreme-court-pick.
187
Farber, supra note 182, at 19.
188
Id. at 28.
189
See generally ALDRICH, supra note 43.

LIVERMORERICHARDSONPROOFS_10.28.19

2019]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

10/29/2019 10:51 AM

43

even if extreme. As outlined above, however, the modern era is instead
characterized by frequent partisan change.190 While the periods of divided
government produce very little legislation, the short waves of unified
government produce partisan legislation.191 Because of the polarized political
climate, these results are extreme and often directly contradict the policy of the
prior administration.192
This cycle of change structures the incentives of political actors at each step,
leading to different outcomes even when political conditions are the same as in
prior eras. For instance, divided government has not always produced inaction.
From the time of Woodrow Wilson, many students of American politics had
assumed that an opposition Congress leads to less new legislation and more
antagonistic oversight.193 Professor Mayhew’s study of the post-World War II
Congress persuasively challenged these assumptions.194 Examining
congressional activity from 1946 to 1990, his work found that congressional
productivity was not demonstrably higher during periods of unified
government.195 Major policy changes like the expansion of social security or the
growth of the regulatory state196 were enacted during periods of divided
government. Examining this data, he concluded that divided government could
be effective.197
Before 1992, this may have been right.198 The benefits of divided
government, however, rely on some degree of political stability. In the years
examined by Professor Mayhew, congressional Democrats could expect both a
stable period as a congressional majority and a high likelihood of Republican
presidential success. At the time, these conditions were atypical: “In the fiftyeight years from 1897 through 1954, the country experienced divided

190

See supra Part II.
FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN 1 (2016).
192
See generally id. at 1–3 (arguing that the electoral parity between the two major parties contributes to
gridlock because each party has a plausible chance of winning the next election, and accordingly has less of an
incentive to cooperate).
193
See, e.g., James L. Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in
the United States, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 613, 617 (1988) (“As soon as political science emerged as a scholarly
discipline, its adherents began to pronounce and elaborate the theoretical foundation of the system of party
government…. [T]he scholars concluded that [parties] were useful and necessary … in unifying a government
of dispersed powers and thereby making it more effective.”).
194
MAYHEW, supra note 51, at 3–5.
195
Id. at 79–80.
196
Id. at 78, 85–87.
197
Id. at 3-4.
198
See LEE, supra note 191, at 1–2, 5 (describing the differing incentives for cooperation during the era of
divided government and the current era).
191
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government during only eight years—all in the last half of the presidential
term—or 14 percent of the time.”199 The electorate during this period, moreover,
had stable preferences. When President Bush was elected in 1988, it marked the
sixth time in eight presidential elections that the voters had simultaneously
chosen a Republican President and a Democratic Congress.200 This stability
created an incentive for both sides to play the hand they were dealt. Democrats
knew that advancement in Congress required working with Republican
presidents, and these presidents knew that delivering on their agenda would
require a measure of bipartisanship.201 By contrast, congressional opponents
today can simply wait for a new election, where the deck will be reshuffled. The
result is that divided government, while structurally the same as ever, leads to
drastically different results in the two eras. Today, divided government means
legislative stagnation, therefore putting more pressure on the executive to act
unilaterally through the administrative state.
Congressional action since 1992 bears this out. While there were some
bipartisan accomplishments in the Clinton and Bush presidencies, they have
become less common. Most of the major legislation passed in recent years—
such as the Affordable Care Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act—was passed with substantial support in only a single party.202 As a result,
it is enacted during the period of unified government at the start of each new
presidency.203 When legislation is bipartisan, it is usually the result of a crisis.
Given this dearth of vehicles to move policy—and the looming threat of the
filibuster in the Senate—most congressional action during this period has taken
the form of “omnibus legislation,” which “addresses numerous and not
necessarily related subjects.”204 Under these conditions, policymaking is tied to

199

Sundquist, supra note 193, at 613.
Id.
201
Id. at 627.
202
Alex Pareene, Political Power Never Lasts. Democrats Need To Use Theirs While They Have It, WASH.
POST (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/political-power-never-lasts-democrats-need-touse-theirs-while-they-have-it/2018/11/09/f5f050d2-e396-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html?noredirect=on&
utm_term=.753dbf326258 (summarizing legislation passed largely by Democrats with unified government in
2009 and 2010).
203
Even during periods of unified government, legislation may still be thwarted by the increasingly
aggressive use of the filibuster. The willingness to use the filibuster to block legislation has grown over time. As
a result, major legislation has often been passed through “reconciliation bills,” which only require a simple
majority. Both the Affordable Care Act and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act were passed this way. These reconciliation
bills, however, are limited to budget-related legislation and are capped at three per year. See generally MEGAN
S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058, THE BUDGET-RECONCILIATION PROCESS:
STAGES OF CONSIDERATION (2017).
204
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX POLICYMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 64 (1997).
200
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“must-pass” budget legislation, often facilitated by procedural mechanisms like
the reconciliation process.205 Since any new signature legislation that is passed
lacks bipartisan support, it is attacked as soon as the opposition takes control of
any of the political branches. For example, the implementation phase of the ACA
exposed “unanticipated difficulties in the statutory design” but “congressional
antipathy to health reform has precluded looking to the legislature to iron out
those difficulties,” leading President Obama to “repeatedly test[] the limits of
executive authority in implementing the [law].”206 After the 2016 presidential
election placed unified power in Republican hands, much of the 2017 legislative
calendar was spent on an effort to repeal the ACA.207 While this attempt was
ultimately unsuccessful, failing by one vote in the Senate,208 the prominence of
ACA repeal on the policy agenda reflected the partisan nature of its passage in
the first instance.
While frequent electoral swings incentivize Congress to obstruct and oppose
compromise, the President turns to unilateral action for policy progress during
divided government. Policymaking comes in the form of new regulations,
enforcement priorities, executive actions, and presidential agreements, rather
than bipartisan legislation. Some of these efforts come in the final days of the
administration as so-called “midnight rules,” just before the Executive Branch
is turned over to the other political party.209 For instance, Obama’s second-term
agenda was almost entirely characterized by executive actions in an area of
policy where legislation had previously failed.210

205

SHAFER, supra note 13, at 163–66.
Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1715, 1716 (2016).
207
Pareene, supra note 202.
208
Ryan Lizza, Why John McCain Killed Obamacare Repeal—Again, NEW YORKER (Sept. 22, 2017).
Notably, no Democrat supported the Obamacare repeal efforts, even though many represented states or districts
that lean heavily Republican. This highly partisan result further supports the recent trends for major legislation
during periods of unified government. Supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text.
209
See Jack Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285, 333–34
(2013). Not surprisingly, the study of midnight rules began to gain force during the Clinton Administration,
which was the first presidency of the era of partisan volatility. Id. at 291. While midnight rules are frequently
critiqued, they may not be all that different in kind from rules promulgated during other periods in a President’s
term, and therefore do not get significant focus here. See generally Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccountable Midnight
Rulemaking?: A Normatively Informative Assessment, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2014) (empirically
examining the practice of midnight rulemaking).
210
See Nancy LeTourneau, Democrats Should Start Talking About Comprehensive Immigration Reform,
WASH. MONTHLY (June 1, 2018) (“When it became clear that their attempts would be successful in blocking
comprehensive immigration reform, President Obama signed DAPA, granting deferred action to parents of
children who were citizens or lawful permanent residents.”); Editorial Board, Don’t Like EPA’s Power-Plant
Plan? Complain to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2016-09-29/don-t-like-epa-s-power-plant-plan-complain-to-congress (“Congress left the Obama administration
206
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The administrative state has felt the weight of these strong policy swings.
Once a wave election has ushered in unified government, the new President
immediately works to undo or undermine the accomplishments of the prior
administration.211 This can involve taking action in an area where the prior
administration had decided to remain inactive, such as the Obama
Administration’s action on climate change, or attempts to reverse or alter
existing regulations. By way of example, the first year of the Trump presidency
involved both legislative and executive attempts to unwind much of Obama-era
policy. On the executive side, new Trump appointees quickly went to work
reversing net neutrality regulations,212 ending the Deferred Action for Child
Arrivals program (DACA),213 withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accords and
terminating parts of the Clean Power Plan,214 and removing national monument
designations for Western lands.215 For all of these (except net neutrality), the
policy change came either from the White House directly or from an executive
agency subject to greater presidential control. The change to net neutrality
originated from an independent agency, the FCC, under the leadership of
Trump’s appointed Chairman, Ajit Pai.216 Once periods of divided government
set in, the agencies become the forum for any new policy initiative and existing
legal authorities are stretched to meet new needs.
In Congress, the regulations of the prior administration are also threatened
by a newly invigorated Congressional Review Act (CRA). The CRA, passed in
1996, provides Congress with a window to undo “major regulations” of
executive agencies following final agency action.217 If Congress decides to take
up a resolution disapproving of the regulation, the CRA ensures expedited

no choice. The only way to avert potentially disastrous climate change is to lower emissions as soon as possible.
Congress’s refusal since 2010 to consider any climate policy at all forced the EPA to look for alternatives.”).
211
FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN 4 (2016).
212
Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852, 7852 (Apr. 23, 2018).
213
Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W.
McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Sept. 5, 2017) (on file with U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec.).
214
Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 51787 (proposed Nov. 8, 2017).
215
Julie Terkowitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/trump-bears-ears.html.
216
Tony Romm, Here’s How the FCC Plans To Defend Its Net Neutrality Repeal in Federal Court, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/12/heres-how-fcc-plans-defendits-net-neutrality-repeal-federal-court/?utm_term=.7bf9402a311e.
217
MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2016). The CRA governs legislative procedure only; it is unlike the general
management laws imposed on the executive to impose procedural obligations on agencies directly.
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procedures, which do not allow for a Senate filibuster.218 To have legal effect,
CRA resolutions must go through bicameralism and presentment like any other
law. As a result, the statute has little import during periods of divided
government when the President could simply veto the resolution. The law
becomes a very important tool, however, when two conditions are present: first,
the same party controls both Congress and the presidency; second, the
regulations of an opposition party president were promulgated recently enough
to be within the CRA window.219 The CRA has only ever been used when both
conditions were present. While both conditions were rare during prior party
systems (occurring only once in the period of divided government, in 1977), they
are an enduring feature of the current era, occurring in 1992, 2000, 2008, and
2016. As such, the CRA has become an important part of modern administrative
governance. Prior to 2016, the statute had only been used once, when the
Republican Congress passed a resolution disapproving a Clinton-era ergonomics
regulation.220 The current Congress has been much more aggressive, using the
CRA to reverse environmental,221 education,222 and labor regulations.223 Apart
from the CRA, modern Congresses operating under divided government also
have greater incentives to obstruct executive branch appointments, leading to
uncertain and harmful consequences.224
The combination of these frequent policy reversals and greater ideological
polarization in agency leadership is destabilizing. The current party system
incentivizes capitalizing on periods of unified government to push partisan
political preferences with little prospect of achieving a bipartisan compromise.
During periods of divided government, the President is more likely to achieve
policy results through executive action than legislative compromise. When
control of government changes hands (as it has consistently throughout the
period), the new President is tasked with implementing laws and regulations that
have no support from within his own party. When the old policies are replaced,
the new regulation often pursues completely different objectives. This sudden
218

Id. at 14.
Id. at 12–13. Holdover appointees can create a context where Congress and the President can use the
CRA effectively well into a new period of unified government.
220
Id. at 5.
221
Stream Protection Rule, Pub. L. No. 115-5, 131 Stat. 10 (2017) (disapproving the Department of the
Interior’s Stream Protection Rule).
222
Department of Education—Teacher Preparation Issues, Pub. L. No. 115-14, 131 Stat. 78 (2017)
(disapproving the Department of Education’s teacher preparation rules).
223
Clarification of Employer’s Continuing Obligation, Pub. L. No. 115-21, 131 Stat. 87 (2017)
(disapproving the Department of Labor’s regulation of reporting employee injury and illness).
224
See Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the Agencies, 64
DUKE L.J. 1571, 1576, 1603–04 (2015).
219
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reversal only lasts as long as the current party maintains control, at which point
the policy swings back. This constant back and forth is a recipe for regulatory
uncertainty, high compliance costs, and ineffective programs.
The example of climate change policy brings these costs into sharp relief.
The Obama Administration finalized the Clean Power Plan (CPP) in October of
2015. As part of this program, the EPA developed state-specific plans with
emission performance targets through 2030.225 Interim performance targets
started in 2022, seven years after the promulgation of the rule. The CPP was an
ambitious plan to tackle the growing problems of anthropogenic carbon
emissions, involving major obligations for state governments and the private
sector. The costs and benefits of both totaled many billions of dollars.226
Implementation of the rule was expected to take decades, with benefits only
exceeding costs once the emissions targets went into effect. In a stable political
environment, this policy design may be successful. Such stability could come
from any one of (1) sustained single party dominance, (2) decreased polarization
such that policy swings are less extreme, or (3) incentives for bipartisan
compromise. The current political environment lacks any of these features.
The CPP demonstrates what happens when these foundations disappear. The
CPP was only put into place after many attempts to pass legislation failed. It was
heavily opposed by the Republican Congress at the time, many of whom
challenged both the legal authority as well as the underlying policy goals.
Lawsuits contesting the program began immediately. When President Obama
left office, a new Republican Congress and administration immediately went to
work repealing the regulation. The costs of this ambitious regulation and sudden
about-face are clear. States and private actors began to incur compliance costs,
but the repeal undermined the climate benefits of those investments. This repeal,
however, is just as unstable as the initial policy, such that new compliance costs
may emerge again soon. Faced with this political climate, the affected industry
cannot rely on a stable regulatory environment, nor can nascent firms in the
energy sector, such as solar or wind power developers, rely on favorable policy.
While the CPP is a salient and potent example of the inefficiencies created
by oscillating control over regulatory decision making, it is hardly unique.
Similar costs are imposed in any area where agencies swing between such
extreme policy positions. Health insurers are currently raising premiums to
respond to drastic changes between the policies of HHS during the Trump and
225
Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,664 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
226
Id. at 64,679–82.
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Obama Administrations.227 Higher education is adjusting to drastic changes in
the rules related to for-profit universities.228 A similar situation exists for other
environmental rollbacks, some of which have been opposed by the regulated
industry they purport to help.
This threat is not unique to administrative regulation. The Republican tax
legislation will also create incentives that may be unwound within a short period.
These costs, however, do pose a unique threat to the legitimacy of agency
actions, which continue to rely on technical expertise to justify their authority.
Legislative outcomes are not (for better or worse) necessarily expected to
proceed along a rational or scientific path. At one level, these experiences could
simply be seen as the price of political responsiveness. Administrative
regulation, however, is not the legislative process. It is governed by a legal
regime premised on a rational relationship to an enduring statutory regime.
Agency regulations are by design more incremental, accounting for uncertainty
and ensuring that the benefits of a change outweigh the costs.229 This is the result
of both internal executive branch guidance, whether in OIRA or the agencies
themselves, and the modern doctrine of arbitrary and capricious review.230 At
present, political forces threaten this model, adding costs that are not currently
part of the analysis. These costs are as real as others, such as health risks and
compliance costs, that agencies are already bound to consider.
C. Erosion of Stabilizing Institutions
Many institutions in administrative law ensure that agency decision-making
is supported by more than sheer political pressures. While the notion that
administration can be exercised wholly independent from politics has
disappeared,231 administrative law remains structured to ensure some degree of
rationality in the policy process, even when politics is inevitably present.
Institutions in all three branches of government serve this function, and therefore
are most important in times of high volatility. Unfortunately, many of these

227

See Blumberg et al., supra note 153.
Michael Stratford, Trump and DeVos Fuel a For-Profit College Comeback, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2017,
4:58 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/31/devos-trump-forprofit-college-education-242193.
229
Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 612
(2014).
230
Id. at 614; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to statute.”).
231
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
228
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institutions are threatened, either through being captured by the broader partisan
dynamics or through marginalization by political actors.232
In the Executive Branch, OIRA is responsible for both ensuring consistent
regulatory approaches and for considering the effects of regulations enacted
across the government.233 In the era of divided government, these features
enabled OIRA to promote the Administration’s favored policy program in the
face of opposition from Congress and, to some degree, agencies themselves.234
After his election, President Clinton retained OIRA and cost-benefit analysis,
despite objections from some in his party,235 and during the era of partisan
volatility (at least prior to the Trump Administration), OIRA served a stabilizing
function.236 Several features of OIRA facilitate this role: the fact that it is a
generalist organization, and therefore difficult for any particular special interest
group to capture; the institution’s coordination function, which naturally
exposes it to multiple constituencies within an administration; the use of costbenefit analysis, which is comprehensive in the interests that it considers; and
the appointment of relatively independent OIRA Administrators.237
Although OIRA’s generalist perspective and coordinating function may help
maintain some semblance of its stabilizing function, indicators during the Trump
Administration do not bode well for the methodology of cost-benefit analysis or
the relative independence of OIRA’s Administrators. On the cost-benefit front,
the Trump Administration has been quite aggressive in manipulating costbenefit analyses to serve prearranged goals and has made ill-considered and
unwise changes to cost-benefit analysis methods and the process of regulatory
review.238 In addition, the appointment of Neomi Rao as the OIRA
232

See infra note 238.
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
234
See generally RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 21–30 (2008) (discussing use
of cost-benefit analysis during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations). The cost-benefit analysis
standard also provided a means for agencies to use their relative substantive sophistication to protect their
independence. See Livermore, supra note 229, at 613.
235
REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 234, at 31–32.
236
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101
GEO. L.J. 1337, 1339 (2013).
237
Id. at 1361–62. OIRA’s stabilizing role naturally generates criticism when it dials back activities that
might otherwise be pursued at the agency level. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the
Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1117 (2006) (arguing that OIRA has usurped the appropriate role of
agencies in interpreting statutes).
238
See JASON SCHWARZ & JEFFREY SHRADER, MUDDYING THE WATERS: HOW THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION IS OBSCURING THE VALUE OF WETLANDS PROTECTION FROM THE CLEAN WATER RULE 1
(2017) (discussing inconsistent treatment of prior studies of regulatory costs and benefits); Caroline Cecot &
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Administrator also departed from longstanding tradition of selecting relatively
moderate technocrats with deep expertise in cost-benefit analysis methodology
for that role.239 Rao, like many other prior appointees from both parties, was
drawn from an academic post.240 But unlike prior appointees (including Sally
Katzen, John Graham, Cass Sunstein, and Howard Shelanski) Rao has no formal
background in economics, cost-benefit analysis, or regulatory practice.241
Instead, her most relevant prior work focused on constitutional questions in
administrative law, such as removal and the delegation doctrine, which are quite
far afield from the technical methodological questions that were previously
considered most relevant for OIRA.242 Rao, however, is regarded as having deep
political connections, having served in both the Bush White House and the
Senate Judiciary Committee.243
Judicial review of agency actions also gives the courts a role as a stabilizing
presence in the regulatory state. Through both procedural and substantive
review, courts are tasked with ensuring that agency decision-making proceeds
along a reliable and scientific course, arriving at decisions that are not “arbitrary
and capricious.”244 As Part II demonstrated, the rigor of judicial review has
changed with the underlying political landscape, beginning as relatively handsoff during the New Deal era and becoming more rigorous in the era of divided
government.245 During the era of partisan volatility, courts have frequently
checked the President’s most ambitious or controversial uses of executive
action, whether in the form of regulatory overreach or inaction. For its part, the
Clinton Administration’s attempt to regulate tobacco as a drug under the Food,

Michael A. Livermore, The One-In, Two-Out Executive Order Is a Zero, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 16
(2017); Jeremy Berg et al., Joint Statement on EPA Proposed Rule and Public Availability of Data, SCIENCE
(May 4, 2018), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6388/eaau0116.full (discussing efforts to ignore
relevant scientific findings on benefits of pollution reduction); Richard L. Revesz, Pruitt Would Like Us to
Ignore the Indirect Benefits of Environmental Regulations, SLATE (June 13, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://slate.com/
technology/2018/06/scott-pruitt-is-trying-to-undermine-environmental-regulation-in-a-creative-way.html
(quoting former EPA Administrator’s promise to alter method of treating secondary effects of regulation).
239
Neomi Rao, Curriculum Vitae (2016) (on file with author).
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1525 (2015); Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control,
65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1276 (2014).
243
Steve Eder, Neomi Rao, The Scholar Who Will Help Lead Trump’s Regulatory Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/business/the-scholar-who-will-help-lead-trumps-assaulton-rules.html. Administrator Rao’s tenure recently ended when she was confirmed to serve as a judge on the
D.C. Circuit.
244
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
245
See supra Part I.B.
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act, following legislative failures in 1998,246 was rejected
by the Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson.247 The Bush-era EPA
was also pushed by the Supreme Court, this time in the direction of greater
regulatory action. Despite the growing consensus around the threats of climate
change, the EPA refused to make a finding that would trigger regulation under
the Clean Air Act. The Court rejected this approach in Massachusetts v. EPA,
finding that the statute only permitted inaction in this situation if the agency
provided a reasoned scientific explanation for its policy.248 More recent
executive actions have been met with similar treatment in the lower courts. The
Obama Administration suffered a second-term setback on DACA,249 while
President Trump saw appellate courts enjoin his early executive actions related
to immigration,250 leading to changes to the policy to survive judicial review.251
The potential for judicial stabilization of administrative action, however,
may be limited, with the current party system threatening to undermine the
independent role of the judiciary. The increased politicization of the judicial
nomination process is nothing new, growing steadily worse throughout the era
of divided government. Much like executive nominations, the number of
vacancies reached new heights during Obama’s second term, with more than
100 vacancies at the time he left office.252 The pace of judicial nominations
quickly picked back up during unified Republican control of Congress. If this
trend continues, fewer and fewer judicial appointments will be the product of

246
Joan Biskupic, FDA Can’t Regulate Tobacco, Supreme Court Rules 5 to 4, WASH. POST (Mar. 22,
2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/03/22/fda-cant-regulate-tobacco-supreme-courtrules-5-to-4/3e3fd725-a469-4261-b660-a3415d2f99c1/?utm_term=.8364a7b7ab17 (describing how FDA action
on tobacco was in response to failed legislative efforts).
247
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
248
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (“EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its
refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore
‘arbitrary, capricious, … or otherwise not in accordance with law.’”).
249
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct.
2271, 2272 (2016).
250
NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 249 (D.D.C. 2018).
251
This ultimately happened to revised versions of the travel ban in June of 2018. See Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
252
Judicial Vacancy List for December 2016, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/
judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2016/12/vacancies (last visited July 5, 2019). This figure was
much higher than when Bush left office (42) or Clinton left office (67). Judicial Vacancy List for December
2008, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2008/12/vacancies (last visited July 5, 2019); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2000, U.S. CTS., https://www.
uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2000/12/vacancies (last visited
July 5, 2019);See also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster
Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1660–61
(2015) (describing failed nominations by administration).
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bipartisan compromise, creating the risk of a more polarized judiciary, or at the
very least the appearance of greater partisanship on the courts.253 The steady
erosion of the filibuster for judicial nominees of all stripes will only exacerbate
the ideological separation between the parties’ nominees.
Many of the stabilizing forces within Congress have also become less
prominent. Permanent committees, which were so often a place for bipartisan
compromise in prior eras, have decreased in importance as omnibus legislation
becomes the only means of moving bills.254 In the place of strong committee
chairs, policy now runs more through party leadership, exacerbating the
ideological character of the legislation.255 At the same time, the nonpartisan
institutions of the Legislative Branch—GAO, CBO, and CRS—are also
shrinking.256 Like the decline in committee staff, this change can be traced to the
cuts following the 1994 midterm elections, right at the start of the current party
system.257 In addition to lower funding levels, the nonpartisan congressional
agencies are also the subject of partisan attacks. For instance, Republican
253
Indeed, there appears to be widespread agreement that the judicial confirmation process is becoming
more politicized. David Russell, Politicization in the Federal Judiciary and Its Effect on the Federal Judicial
Function, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 21, 26 (2018). Many commentators ascribed this trend to the
Robert Bork nomination. Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (1988); John M. Walker, Jr., The Unfortunate Politicization of Judicial
Confirmation Hearings, ATLANTIC (July 9, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/07/theunfortunate-politicization-of-judicial-confirmation-hearings/259445/. There is an active debate regarding
whether increased politicization is necessarily a bad thing. BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS:
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 76–77 (Peter Berkowitz & Tod Lindberg eds., 1st ed.
2006); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203
(1988).
254
See LARA E. CHAUSOW, R. ERIC PETERSON & AMBER HOPE WILHELM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43947, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER, COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP, AND OTHER
OFFICES, 1977-2016 (2016) (describing the shift from committee staff to individual member office support over
time). This decline in staff began right at the beginning of the era of partisan volatility, with the Republican
takeover of Congress in 1994. See Russell W. Mills & Jennifer L. Selin, Congressional Committee Staff Have
Shrunk. Here Is One Way Congress Makes up the Difference, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/14/congressional-committee-staffs-have-shrunk-heresone-way-congress-makes-up-the-difference/?noredirect=on. Many commentators have noted the declining role
of congressional committees and called for a rebalancing of the committee-leadership relationship. See, e.g.,
Kevin R. Kosar & Adam Chan, R Street Policy Study No. 66: A Case for Stronger Congressional Committees,
R ST. INST. 1 (Aug. 2016) (“[T]he clearest path ahead may be to go backward, away from a hierarchical,
leadership-dominated model of operating the chambers to one that disperses more power to committees.”).
255
KEVIN R. KOSAR & ADAM CHAN, R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 66: A CASE FOR STRONGER
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 1 (2016).
256
Curtlyn Kramer, Vital Stats: Congress Has a Staffing Problem Too, BROOKINGS INST.(May 24, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/05/24/vital-stats-congress-has-a-staffing-problem-too/.
257
These deep cuts also included the elimination of another Legislative Branch institution, the Office of
Technology Assessment, which provided “nonpartisan scientific studies of policy decisions.” Ed O’Keefe, When
Congress Wiped an Agency Off the Map, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
federal-eye/post/when-congress-wiped-an-agency-off-the-map/2011/11/29/gIQAIt0J9N_blog.html.
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leadership challenged the CBO during the fight for ACA repeal in 2017, going
so far as to threaten the agency’s traditional role in developing a budget score
for pending legislation.258 At one point in the debate, members of Congress
“floated the unprecedented idea of using the HHS score alone, or in concert with
an evaluation from the White House Office of Management and Budget, as a
substitute for the CBO’s score.”259 Rather than turning to these institutions to
provide stability, the current party system encourages Congress to marginalize
these agencies when they stand in the way of achieving partisan objectives.
A final erosion in a stabilizing institution that is characteristic of the time
concerns the intersection of polarization and the states. Former House Speaker
Tip O’Neill (whose leadership in Congress coincided with much of the era of
divided government) is closely associated with the phrase “all politics is local,”
but this truism has become increasingly outdated in a time of increasingly
ideologically oriented and polarized partisan affiliation.260 One consequence of
this change is that, when states play a role in implementing federal policy (as
they often do), it creates additional opportunities for partisan contestation, rather
than an opportunity to accommodate local interests or secure bipartisan
cooperation through the distribution of local benefits.261 States can resist federal
policy through their own independent actions, and often do.262 As a result,
intergovernmental programs like Medicaid or funds for elementary and
secondary education face two distinct kinds of pressure. First, they are subject
to the same instability over time as all other federal programs. The choice to
implement the program through state actors, however, introduces a second
pressure: political opposition from the states in real time.263 This not only
emerges from the states taking steps as autonomous actors, such as passing laws
that frustrate federal policy or refusing to participate in a federal scheme, but it
also comes from within programs, as states use the flexibility provided by the
statutory scheme to deviate from federal policy preferences.264 Liberal states, for
258
Vann R. Newkirk II, The GOP Escalates Its Battle with the CBO, ATLANTIC (July 22, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/republicans-cbo-hhs-score-bcra/534480/.
259
Id.
260
See generally DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY AMERICAN
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED 227–28 (2018).
261
See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 3, at 995.
262
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 35, at 1267; see also DEIL S. WRIGHT, UNDERSTANDING
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 49 (1978) (presenting a model of federalism premised on overlapping
authority, in which the federal government was not in hierarchical relationship with state and local actors).
263
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 35.
264
See id. at 1264 (“[W]e argue that contestation can and does take place in many areas of federalism
where states lack policymaking autonomy…. We do not quibble with the idea that sovereignty confers one sort
of power, but we think it is a mistake to neglect the possibilities associated with a different sort of power – the
power of the servant.”).
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instance, refused to administer parts of the Patriot Act during the Bush
Administration,265 just as many Republican states refused to expand Medicaid
through ACA during the Obama years.266 In addition, intergovernmental
administrative schemes are not the only forum where state-level actors use their
position to engage in partisan conflict over regulatory or administrative matters.
In recent years, state attorneys general, acting through expanded solicitor general
offices, have become very active in litigation involving federal law.267 For
example, the Solicitor General of Utah filed an amicus brief on behalf of Utah
and fifteen other states in Lucia v. SEC, a case about the Appointments Clause.268
In doing so, they cited an interest in “protect[ing] the structural safeguards
embedded in the Constitution,” even though federalism was not at issue.269
States are now a regular voice in highly charged litigation throughout the federal
courts, offering yet another means of engaging in partisan disagreement.
The combined effects of increasingly nationalized politics, competitive
partisan balance, ideological polarization, and weak party control prevent any
single actor from limiting the harms that the current political system imposes on
reasoned decision-making. Government is often divided, but not consistently
enough to create the cooperative incentives of the 1970s and 1980s. Presidents
are empowered to act unilaterally, but frequent changes in White House control
limit the reach of policymaking to the next election. The courts and the states
are drawn into the national political fight, rather than remaining in separate,
more independent spheres. And meanwhile, political actors respond to increased
polarization by pursuing ever-more extreme policy, unchecked by moderating
forces in the elite party leadership.
The political trends discussed in this Part exist against a backdrop of
administrative law doctrines that shape the incentives and options available to
the relevant players. As seen in prior eras, administrative law has proven to be
remarkably flexible, evolving in tandem with other political and administrative
institutions. But, the mere fact that administrative law can and does change does
not imply that those changes are normatively desirable—just as administrative
265
See id. at 1278 (documenting state opposition to the Patriot Act based on state interpretations of the
federal Constitution).
266
This decision was made easier for states following the Supreme Court’s holding that all existing
Medicaid funds could not be conditional on the expansion under the ACA. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
585 (2012).
267
See Claire McCusker, The Federalism Challenges of Impact Litigation by State and Local Government
Actors, 118 YALE L.J. 1557, 1557 (2009).
268
Brief for Utah et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No.
17-130).
269
Id. at 1.
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law reforms might serve as a useful counterweight to negative pressures within
a party system, they might also exacerbate its worse impulses. As we discuss in
the following Part, the direction of U.S. administrative law does not appear well
suited to meeting the growing challenges posed by the current political climate.
III. (MAL)ADAPTIVE DOCTRINE
The current party system and its interaction with administrative law pose
serious threats to many values that are central to effective administration.
Policies are more extreme and volatile and stabilizing institutions are less
effective. Many of the administrative law staples that were at least arguably well
suited to an era of sustained divided government—such as a strong OIRA, a
lighter touch approach to judicial review of agency action, and a more political
agency leadership—do little to mitigate the worst impulses of the new system.
Administrative law doctrine that was adapted to the current political
environmental, however, could alleviate some of the worst tendencies of partisan
volatility toward instability and irrationality. For example, the era of partisan
volatility is especially likely to produce extreme policy reversals, whereby the
major initiatives of one administration are rolled back in toto within a matter of
years. Given this concern, doctrines that scrutinizes these reversals more
rigorously than other sorts of agency action could at least reduce the extent of
this negative tendency. Similarly, it may be that certain ways of structuring the
government, such as limiting partisan influence through for-cause removal
restrictions or the multi-member commission structure, facilitate stability and
incrementalism and should be supported.
Unfortunately, the Court has shown little interest in doctrines that would
reduce the risks of partisan volatility and, instead, seems more inclined toward
administrative law reforms that are likely to exacerbate these risks. With respect
to policy reversals, the Court’s most recent word on the issue came in FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., which did not embrace heightened review of policy
changes.270 In addition, two signature areas of potential administrative law
reforms for the Roberts Court—reducing the insulation of independent agencies
from presidential control, and erosion of Chevron deference to agency legal
interpretations—have substantial downside risks in the current political
environment. With respect to independent agencies, the Court’s path is likely to
exacerbate some of the worst pathologies of partisan volatility. The Court’s
formal approach to these questions has pushed in the direction of a more unified
270

556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009).

LIVERMORERICHARDSONPROOFS_10.28.19

2019]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

10/29/2019 10:51 AM

57

Executive Branch with clearer lines of accountability to the political process.
While the current doctrine leaves many questions unanswered, a continuation of
this trend would further expose agency decision-making to back and forth of
partisan volatility.
The consequences of the decline of Chevron are more ambiguous. The
Court’s current move toward implementation of a major questions doctrine
would insert courts into exactly those questions that are most politically salient,
and therefore the most polarized along partisan lines.271 Repeated forays into the
heart of the most deeply contested policy questions of the day runs the risk of
undermining the legitimacy of judicial review and increasing partisan pressure
on the process of judicial nomination and confirmation. However, revisions to
Chevron deference also hold out some promise for promoting stability in the
administrative system. Under existing deference doctrines, agencies can adjust
legal interpretations in a way that stare decisis would typically not allow. Given
the volatile nature of the current party system, placing more interpretive power
in courts could have a stabilizing effect. But rather than focusing on the risks
where courts could add some value—namely reversals of earlier legal
interpretations—the Court seems more likely to shift judicial attention where it
is least well suited by expanding the major questions doctrine.
In this Part, we take up each of these issues: arbitrary or capricious review
of policy reversal, constitutional questions related to agency independence, and
deference to agencies’ legal interpretations. We argue that the effect of future
decisions in each of these areas can only be understood by explicitly considering
the context set by partisan volatility. Doctrine that fits the needs of the day can
promote effective administration and protect the core values of administrative
law. Maladaptive doctrine will leave more harmful effects of partisan volatility
unchecked, continuing our current experience of destabilizing policy swings and
extreme policymaking. In any event, knowing how each doctrine interacts with
the dynamics of the current party system is essential to understanding its
implications.
A. Review of Policy Reversals
The era of partisan volatility leads to frequent reversals of position on
significant policy questions. One highly ideological political party is replaced in
the White House by a President at the other ideological extreme, often equipped
271
The major questions doctrine can be traced to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120 (2000). See Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL.
& ADMIN. L. 479 (2016) (tracing the history of the doctrine).
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with a only short period of unified government. As a result, sudden policy
reversals are common, such as the Trump Administration’s about-face on
climate change regulations, net neutrality, and deportation policy for immigrants
who arrived in the United States as children.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish policy reversals from policy
development. Any competent agency will reevaluate past decisions, just as it
will look to new facts in determining if further action is needed. In keeping with
this practice, OIRA expects agencies to take a look at old regulations at least
once every five years.272 We distinguish this sort of updating from a true “policy
reversal.” Whereas the former is motivated by new facts in the world, the latter
is motivated by a simple disagreement of policy, itself rooted in ideological and
partisan concerns.
To illustrate, consider the Obama-era change to the overtime rule for whitecollar workers. In 2004, the Bush Administration updated the overtime rule to
raise the exemption threshold to $455 per week (or $23,660 per year).273 Under
that policy, workers making less than that amount would receive overtime pay,
while those making more would be exempt. The Obama Administration’s update
to this rule doubled that amount to $913 per week (or $47,476 per year).274 Part
of this increase reflects little more than the usual updating you might expect an
agency to undertake in light of new economic data and a rising cost of living. In
the final rule, the Department of Labor noted that the salary level had been
updated seven times since 1938, of which this was simply the latest iteration.275
Other motives for the new rule, however, bottom out on policy disagreement.
The Obama-era rule, for instance, noted that it disagreed with the Bush
Administration methodology that made it easier to exempt lower-paid
employees from the overtime rules.276
It is this latter sort of policy change, which is driven by ideological and
value-based concerns, that is likely to become both more common and more
destabilizing as partisan volatility exerts pressure on the administrative state.
Apart from the recent examples cited above, policy reversal has characterized
each transition since 1992. Examples include the Bush Administration rollback
272
See Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 57, 58–59
(2013) (describing regulatory “look-back” initiatives of the Obama Administration).
273
Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales
and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,123 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
274
Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales
and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,391, 32,393 (May 23, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
275
Id. at 32,392.
276
Id. at 32,396 (explaining that “the FLSA’s overtime protections are a linchpin of the middle class”).
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of Clinton-era mining rules277 and Obama Administration reversal of Bush-era
rules on hours of service for long haul truck drivers.278
Current practices do not fully account for the costs of these reversals, either
as a matter of judicial doctrine or Executive Branch review. First, the Supreme
Court does not explicitly apply additional scrutiny to agency actions that reverse
previous policy determinations. This position is most clearly stated in FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., where Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that there
“is no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act ... that all agency change be
subject to more searching review,” or that “agency action representing a policy
change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt
the policy in the first instance.”279 Under this view, an agency must be aware
that the new policy is a departure from existing practices and must have reasons
for the departure, but it does not need to compare the reasons to those that
justified the previous regulation.280 As a result, under the logic adopted in Justice
Scalia’s opinion, agencies can work from the existing regulations in the same
way as they would from a blank slate.281
In a vacuum, this interpretation of the APA might make sense. Such a
practice ensures that agencies are aware of prior policy, recognize the departure,
and provide a justification for the new practice. By not requiring more, the
decision in Fox Television Stations allows for greater political responsiveness in
agency decision-making. Since the standard applied to the policy reversal at
Time 2 is the same as the initial determination at Time 1, the political party with
control over the agency at Time 1 has no advantage. When an agency comes
under new leadership, this standard simply allows for different conclusions on
the same set of facts, without more.
Whatever merits this approach has, it’s clear disadvantage is regulatory

277
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush White House Reverses Clinton Decision on Mining, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26,
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/26/us/bush-white-house-reverses-clinton-decision-on-mining.html.
278
The Bush Administration’s rule concerning hours of service for commercial truckers was promulgated
in 2008, after years of litigation challenging earlier iterations. See Hours of Service of Drivers, 73 Fed. Reg.
69567, 69568 (Nov. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76). The new Obama-era rule was promulgated in
2011. See Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Hours of Service of Drivers, 76 Fed. Reg. 81134, 81134
(Dec. 27, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 385, 386, 390, 395).
279
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009).
280
Id. at 515.
281
As in many areas of law, the Justices’ proclivity to produce numerous concurring and dissenting
opinions muddies the waters of Fox Television Stations somewhat. In particular, Justice Kennedy provided the
deciding vote and wrote separately to note that he agreed with some of the arguments found in Justice Breyer’s
dissent, which did urge more probing review of agency policy reversals. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 509–13 (6th ed. 2018).
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instability. As the Court subsequently explained (in the context of Chevron
deference), “an agency must also be cognizant that longstanding policies” may
have “engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.”282
As Justice Breyer’s dissent in Fox Television Stations recognized, the majority’s
standard allows for policy change on the basis of “unexplained policy
preferences,” not new facts.283 Rather than treat the FCC decision as
unconstrained by prior agency actions, Justice Stevens’s dissent went further,
connecting the doctrine to the FCC’s role as an independent regulator and expert
in its field: “There should be a strong presumption that the FCC’s initial views,
reflecting the informed judgment of independent Commissioners with expertise
in the regulated area, also reflect the views of the Congress that delegated the
Commission authority to flesh out details not fully defined in the enacting
statute.”284 As the dissent understood the issue, a failure to require a factual basis
for the departure from prior policy elevated political responsiveness over
independent expertise.285
The reliance interests associated with policy reversals impose serious costs
in any political context. They pose especially high costs in the current system.
Control of Executive Branch policy has changed course every eight years since
1992. These changes, moreover, have been exacerbated by extreme polarization.
A rational actor in today’s government, therefore, should recognize that the
policies she puts in place are not only likely to erode or be ignored after the next
election, but may be completely overhauled. The experience of the Clean Power
Plan, discussed above, demonstrates how substantial these changes can be.286
The current approach to judicial review of agency action does generally require
an agency to take costs into account, and this would presumably include the sunk
costs or reliance interests of prior rules.287 As Fox Television Stations
demonstrates, however, these requirements often will not impose real constraints
282
See Encino Motorcars LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) (quoting Fox Television
Stations, 556 U.S. at 515–16).
283
Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
284
Id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285
See id. The actual difference between the majority and dissenting opinions in Fox Television Stations
is uncertain. The majority references the importance of “reliance interests,” but the rule explicitly declines to
impose a higher burden for situations in which a prior decision created such interests. Some lower courts,
however, have read the majority to arrive at a position comparable to that of the dissent. Judge Williams’ opinion
in U.S. Telecommunications is such an example. U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 744-45 (D.C.
Cir. 2016). Both sides seem to agree that the reliance created by prior regulations is important; the Breyer dissent,
however, would require a higher justification to overcome these interests.
286
See supra notes 225–229 and accompanying text.
287
See, e.g., Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74, 101 (D.D.C. 2018). The district court in Bauer, applying
the analysis of the majority in Fox Television Stations, found that the agency has insufficiently explained its
reasons for changing its view of the legality of regulations related to student loan borrowers. Id.
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on sudden about-faces from an agency.288 A more explicit approach that is
specifically targeted at policy reversals, such as the approach advocated by
Justice Breyer’s dissent in that case, would be an improvement.
In brief, this position starts from a simple requirement: “To explain a change
requires more than setting forth reasons why the new policy is a good one. It
also requires the agency to answer the question, ‘Why did you change?’”289 This
inquiry is necessarily more demanding than review of the initial decision, written
on a blank slate.290 Under this approach to arbitrary and capricious review, the
costs of change must be addressed on their own terms. An agency that sought to
significantly modify or repeal an existing rule would need to engage in
additional fact-finding or analysis to support this conclusion. It may also need
to account for uncertainty costs created by the change itself, as well as the
likelihood that the new proposed rule would face opposition in a relatively short
period of time. When taken into account, these considerations could have two
effects. First, they would lead regulators to make more incremental changes to
existing policy, given that more substantial deviations would require additional
expense and likely impose greater costs. Second, the regulatory agencies,
constrained by limited resources, would have incentives to focus on new issues,
rather than revisiting prior regulations.
The recent experience with net neutrality provides an example of where a
more rigorous review of policy reversals may matter. In 2015, the FCC finalized
the Open Internet Order.291 This Order followed from prior unsuccessful efforts
to require “net neutrality,” which prevents blocking and discrimination by
broadband internet providers.292 The 2015 Order imposed a range of new
requirements of broadband internet providers, including “bright-line bans on
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.”293 In supporting these regulations,

288
See also ADRIAN VERMUELE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE 160 (2016) (collecting cases since State Farm and finding that agencies often prevail under arbitrary and
capricious review).
289
Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 549.
290
Justice Breyer illustrates the point: “An (imaginary) administrator explaining why he chose a policy
that requires driving on the right side, rather than the left side, of the road might say, ‘Well, one side seemed as
good as the other, so I flipped a coin.’ But even assuming the rationality of that explanation for an initial choice,
that explanation is not at all rational if offered to explain why the administrator changed driving practice, from
right side to left side, 25 years later.” Id.
291
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20).
292
The initial rule was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit, which found that the FCC could not proceed
without reclassifying broadband providers under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. Verizon v. FCC,
740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
293
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. at 19,740.
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the agency pointed to the prior decision of the D.C. Circuit, which had found its
conclusions of fact supported by the record at the time.294 The 2015 Order itself
involved a policy reversal, changing the classification of broadband providers
from internet services to telecommunications services, which allowed for
regulating this industry as common carriers.295 This change, however, was based
on more than a decade of technological change, reflected in the new facts set
forth in the agency record.296 The policy was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 2016,
which cited to Fox Televisions Stations for the applicable standard.297 Judge
Williams dissented on this point, placing more importance on the “reliance
interests” language in Fox Television Stations.298 On this view, the FCC failed
to adequately consider whether the new facts overcame the reliance interests
created by the old rule.299
Despite this authority for the new rule’s legality, the FCC changed course
again only a year later. Following the election of Donald Trump and the
appointment of Ajit Pai to head the FCC, the agency released its Restoring
Internet Freedom Order on December 14, 2017.300 The Order reversed the Title
II reclassification for internet providers and removed the additional disclosure
requirements of the Open Internet Order of 2015, along with other changes.301
In the separate cost-benefit analysis that accompanied the 2017 Order, the FCC
found that many of the prior regulations had no benefits at all, while finding that
the rule led to significant costs for innovation and created uncertainty in the
affected industries, directly refuting the agency’s earlier expert assessment.302
The agency did not, however, consider the uncertainty costs associated with the
new rule itself, or the broader political climate concerning the issue.303 The 2017
Order generated considerable opposition, including from Senate Democrats in
advance of the 2018 midterms,304 and it very well may find itself undermined if
party balance swings back to Democrats.
The result of this back and forth is that, in a period of less than three years,

294

Verizon, 740 F.3d at 643–44.
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. at 19,742–43.
296
Id. at 19,743.
297
U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 706–07 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
298
Id. at 745–46 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
299
Id. at 748.
300
Restoring Internet Freedom, FCC 17-166, (2017) (declaratory ruling, report and order, and order).
301
Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.
302
Id. at ¶¶ 304–12.
303
Id.
304
John Hendel, Senate Democrats Score Net Neutrality Win in Bid for Midterm Momentum, POLITICO
(May 16, 2018, 9:53 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/16/senate-democrats-net-neutrality-539275.
295
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both parties have pushed diametrically opposed policies, affecting an innovative
and sizable industry, through unilateral executive action, which has been swiftly
challenged in Congress and the courts. The first policy was reversed in a matter
of years, and the new policy finds itself under attack. Despite these predictable
political outcomes, present since 1992, the agency did not make explicit
findings, at either stage, regarding the cost associated with political instability.
This single example demonstrates a much broader trend. Agencies are led
by political leadership focused on pursuing increasingly ideological policy.
Their successors, reliably a member of the other party, are incentivized to
undercut prior efforts. As currently understood, arbitrary and capricious review
does not account for how likely this fact pattern is at present.
Greater scrutiny of reversals would mitigate the costs of political instability,
leading to more incremental policymaking. This scrutiny would also incentivize
a more forward-looking regulatory agenda.305 If the courts looked with more
skepticism on agency decisions to revisit their earlier policy choices, the agency
will have greater reason to look in new directions. For instance, an FCC chair
may be less willing to spend his first year revisiting net neutrality and may
instead look to an area in need of attention, such as increasing broadband access.
This is not to say that all deregulation should be more difficult than imposing
new regulations. Adopting the position advanced by Justice Breyer in Fox
Television Stations would instead prevent deregulation—or new regulation—
that reflects a naked policy choice, rather than a change premised on a new
factual record.306 Moreover, the rule is not absolute. Agencies are allowed to
deviate from prior practice on the basis of policy, they just must provide a more
thorough explanation than if operating from a blank slate.307 To paraphrase
Justice Breyer, a decision to change which side of the road we drive on needs a

305
A failure to appropriately consider reliance interests was part of the basis for a recent decision finding
that the Trump Administration’s decision to end the DACA program was unsupported. NAACP v. Trump, 315
F. Supp. 3d 457, 473 (D.D.C. 2018). The opinion adopts a more robust reading of the Supreme Court’s current
case law regarding policy reversals, suggesting the law may be ripe for an explicit adoption of the standard we
advocate. Id. (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016)) (“[I]t is not up to
Secretary Nielsen—or even to this Court—to decide what she should or should not consider when reversing
agency policy. Rather, the requirements are set by the APA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court: ‘When an
agency changes its existing position, it … must … be cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered
serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’”).
306
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 549 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
307
Id.
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greater explanation than picking the right side in the first place, especially when
the road signs will just be changed back in a few years.308
Of course, Justice Breyer was in dissent in Fox Television Stations, and his
more rigorous approach to policy reversals has not carried the day. It may be too
soon to call the matter closed, however. Even if the unique costs of reversals are
not explicitly part of the doctrine at present, the instruction to consider reliance
costs may allow courts to require a similar level of scrutiny under “traditional”
arbitrary and capricious review. The Trump Administration, for instance, has
had a difficult time in the lower courts trying to justify policy reversals.309 A
doctrine that makes these costs explicit would obviously be preferable to one
that does not, but it may be that the courts are becoming more cognizant of the
unique costs sudden policy reversals pose.
B. Agency Independence
Another area of recent attention by the Supreme Court is agency
independence. In setting up agencies, Congress makes a number of choices
about how its leaders will be selected, how its funds will be allocated, and how
its relationship with the White House will be structured. In defining
constitutional limits on these choices, the Court has recently shown a willingness
to impose new constraints on the use of institutional design to insulate agencies
from political control, increasing agency exposure to the volatile influence of
political oversight.310
Many recent constitutional challenges seek to restrict agencies’ statutory
independence from the President. The first of these challenges involves the
independence of agency heads while in office. The second involves selection,
asking whether certain officials are “officers” at all. The resolution of each
question has the potential to place agencies under greater political control, with
a corresponding loss of control for employment-protected career civil servants.
First, the Supreme Court has long recognized that there may be some limit
to Congress’ authority to restrict the President’s control over Executive Branch
officers.311 Since the New Deal era, the Supreme Court was willing to uphold all
308

Id.
Roundup: Trump-Era Deregulation in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, https://policyintegrity.
org/deregulation-roundup (last updated Aug. 6, 2019) (documenting historically low win rate for the Trump
Administration in legal challenges to agency decisions).
310
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010).
311
For a general discussion of the structural conditions that make agencies more independent from
political influence, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
309
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manner of restrictions on presidential control.312 This trend ended in 2010 with
the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.313 In severing a
provision providing a for-cause removal provision for inferior officers within
the SEC, the Court found that the Vesting Clause of Article II operates as an
independent bar on removal restrictions, echoing the earlier, more restrictive
rationale of Myers v. United States.314 The reach of this decision is uncertain,
with much of the opinion grounded in the perception that the PCAOB structure
was unlike any the Court had previously considered.315 In fact, the Supreme
Court was careful to note that the decision did not disrupt the prevailing doctrine
for agencies with only one layer of removal protection.316 Some scholars,
however, (including the former Administrator of OIRA, Neomi Rao) have
seized on the more expansive language of the opinion to argue for the
invalidation of all similar provisions in federal law.317
Even more recently, challengers made a similar argument against the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, established as part of the Dodd-Frank
financial reforms.318 These challenges are premised on the unique combination
of features found in the CFPB, which insulate the agency from some of the
political controls of both the President and Congress. While the agency’s
structure was recently upheld by the D.C. Circuit, the issue led to a fractured
court, with numerous concurrences and dissents on the constitutional
question.319 This dispute, moreover, is not limited to an application of an agreed
upon test for questions of agency independence. Instead, the judges disagreed
about how to reconcile the Supreme Court’s precedents in this area.320 Even
89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).
312
See, e.g., Nixon v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding a statute that allowed for
agencies to manage presidential records over a claim of privilege); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935) (upholding a for-cause removal restriction on a federal officer).
313
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484.
314
Id. at 492–93 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926)).
315
See Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary
Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2011) (“In
Free Enterprise Fund, the Court thus had something of a free pass in invalidating the Board’s structure: it could
hold this peculiar design to be an unconstitutional limitation on the president’s Article II powers without putting
much else about the structure of administrative government up for grabs.”).
316
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 514.
317
Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2559 (2011) (“Despite claims to minimalism by the Court, Free Enterprise Fund
logically implicates the constitutionality of agency independence.”); see also Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary
and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2014).
318
See generally PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 92–101 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(en banc).
319
Id. at 110-111.
320
See generally id.
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more recently, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal Housing
Finance Agency was unconstitutionally structured.321 As a result, the issue is
likely to arrive at the Court in due time, when the authority of the President to
control agencies under the Vesting Clause will be revisited. When it does, the
Court may be more inclined to strike down statutes designed to insulate agencies
than it was before. Its newest member, Justice Kavanaugh, was on the D.C.
Circuit panel that heard the challenge to PCAOB’s structure, and dissented from
his colleagues’ view that there was no constitutional problem,322 and also
dissented from the en banc decision upholding the removal restriction for the
head of the CFPB.323
The second recent fight has been fought on much more familiar terrain: the
Appointments Clause. Since Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court has been
distinguishing between principal officers, inferior officers, and mere employees.
Rather than leaving these determinations to Congress, at least in situations where
the Constitution does not explicitly say otherwise, the Buckley Court found that
all government personnel who “[exercise] significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States” are officers.324 Even though the current Court appears
to be uniformly committed to this project, the actual line-drawing has created
much disagreement and confusion. The decisions differentiating principal
officers from their inferior counterparts have generated significant controversy,
with the Court applying different formulations in two prominent cases, Morrison
v. Olson and Edmond v. United States.325 Likewise, the line between employees
and officers has proven difficult to discern. The Court’s most thorough
consideration of the topic, Freytag v. Commissioner,326 adopted a factors-based
approach that divided the lower courts.327
Because of Free Enterprise Fund, where the Court found that two layers of
for-cause removal protection was impermissible for officers, the importance of
these issues has only grown.328 The intersection between the Court’s
appointment and removal jurisprudence was on display in Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, decided by the D.C.

321

Collins v. Mnuchin, 869 F.3d 640, 674 (5th Cir. 2018).
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 685, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
323
PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 110–11.
324
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
325
Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 at 671–73 (1988), with Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S.
651, 662–63 (1997).
326
See 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
327
Intercoll. Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
328
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 514.
322
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Circuit in 2012.329 Faced with a statute that provided for-cause removal for the
Copyright Royalty Board, the Court reasoned that if the Board members were
principal officers (based on the removal protection) then their appointment by
the Librarian of Congress would be unconstitutional.330 Under these two
doctrines, the Court has created a link between the political control exercised by
the President and the government personnel that must be selected through the
political mechanism of the Appointments Clause.
Lucia v. SEC is the most recent foray into this area, and yet another win for
those who favor a more expansive view of “officer” under the Appointments
Clause.331 Adhering to the test set forth in Freytag, the majority found that SEC
administrative law judges (ALJs) are officers of the United States.332 Reasoning
by analogy, the Court found that the duration of the ALJ office, the discretion
ALJs exercise, and the significance of the decisions ALJs make either mirrored
or went beyond the judges at issue in Freytag.333 The majority opinion did not
go beyond this analogy,334 and the scope of the opinion is an open question for
other ALJs and non-ALJ adjudicators, including the hundreds handling
immigration and social security cases.335 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch,
however, are prepared to go much further, finding a constitutional officer in any
employee who has “an ongoing statutory duty.”336 In declining to reach the
statutory question, Justice Breyer noted the broader implications of the Court’s
position. Noting the connection between Free Enterprise Fund and the
Appointments Clause jurisprudence, he suggested that a finding that ALJs are
officers could imperil not only their selection process, but also their removal
protections.337 Lucia does not provide an answer to these questions, but it did
signal that other ALJs may soon be at risk, either under the Freytag analysis or
the more ambitious approach of Justice Thomas’s concurrence.
Taken together, these changes in the doctrine suggest that two things will
become more likely in the future. First, agency leadership will be subject to

329

Id.
Id.
331
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018).
332
Id. at 2055.
333
Id. at 2053.
334
Id. (“Freytag says everything necessary to decide this case.”).
335
See generally KENT BARNETT ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NONALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL (Draft Report
Feb. 14, 2018) in 53 GA. L. REV. 1 (2019) (examining role of non-ALJ adjudicators).
336
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc. 137 S. Ct.
929, 946 (2017)).
337
Id. at 2061–62 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
330
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greater political control,338 especially in light of the enthusiasm shown by the
Trump Administration to use these decisions as an opportunity to go even
further.339 Second, the Executive Branch will require more personnel confirmed
by the Senate to sustain current operations. These developments bring the hyperpartisanship and volatility of the political climate further into the administrative
state. Additional positions subject to Senate confirmation create additional
forums for partisan conflict. In unified government, these positions will become
more extreme. In divided government, they will likely go vacant for sustained
periods of time. Once appointed, a shift toward greater political control means
they will pursue more ideological policy and bring further confrontation to the
regulatory agenda. By constitutionalizing these administrative structures, a legal
regime that emboldens the Vesting Clause and adopts a more expansive
definition of “officers” prevents Congress from taking steps to allow agencies
to better weather more intense political winds.340
C. Deference
Chevron and Auer deference have become perennial topics of debate in
administrative law, and the Court has shown increased appetite toward doctrinal
reform in the area of judicial deference to agencies’ legal interpretations.
Accounting for the current party systems helps clarify some of the stakes to this
reform effort. The dominant approach by the Court, and one embraced by at least
some academic commentators, has been to reduce the level of deference given
to agency interpretations that implicate “major questions” of law and policy.341
338
Greater political control does not necessarily mean a more politically responsive government. Even if
elections reward candidates who reflect the views of the median voter in the electorate, elected officials will still
reliably deviate from those views. In that situation, bureaucratic insulation may impose a “compensatory inertia”
on policymaking process and actually bring policy outcomes closer to the views of the electorate. See Matthew
C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2008) (“Up to a point,
the benefit to a majority of voters from a reduction in outcome variance [that results from bureaucratic insulation]
outweighs the costs associated with biasing the expected outcome away from the median voter’s ideal
outcome.”).
339
See Lubbers, supra note 6, at 6–7.
340
These doctrinal developments also put more pressure on the internal constraints placed on agencies,
which are largely beyond the reach of courts. Internal agency processes have become a greater focus of attention
in recent years and could be challenged by greater political influence on agency leadership. See Jennifer Nou,
Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 424 (2015) (providing a general theory of how these
structures are developed); see, e.g., Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal
Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 404–12 (2013) (describing how internal processes altered outcomes
in the national security context).
341
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 157 (2000); see also LAWSON, supra note 11, at 673. But see Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases
From Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 358 (2016)
(defending the major questions doctrine as a means of keeping judges from overturning Chevron in its entirety
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At a time of increasing polarization, this represents a risky approach because it
inserts the judiciary exactly where it is least welcome: into the most
controversial and contested policy issues, with heated positions on both sides.
To the degree that the major questions doctrine increases the perception of
judges as carrying out a partisan agenda, it risks undermining the legitimacy of
the judiciary and increasing partisan influence over the nomination and
confirmation of judges.
However, there is a countervailing pressure that provides some reason to
endorse a decline of deference, at least under certain circumstances. Under
Chevron, agencies can change their minds about the law (within reason) without
any especially high bar to doing so.342 If Chevron were weakened, legal change
would be constrained by normal principles of stare decisis. As discussed above,
the era of partisan volatility makes this tradeoff between stability and flexibility
especially important as reversals on questions of law become more and more
common.343 Were courts to increase their scrutiny of changes to legal
interpretations (mirroring the heightened arbitrary and capricious review
discussed above) that could help mitigate the problem of policy oscillation and
regulatory uncertainty inherent in an era of partisan volatility.
Under the doctrine of Chevron deference, courts will defer to agency
interpretations of federal statutes in certain situations. Auer deference provides
agencies with similar interpretive latitude for interpretations of their own
regulations.344 Few legal topics have received more sustained attention in recent
years than the continued vitality of these doctrines.345 The confirmation of
Justice Gorsuch to the Supreme Court in 2017 gave additional momentum to
Chevron’s detractors, who rightfully saw him as a skeptic of the doctrine.346
While the debate surrounding Chevron has largely focused on internal legal
objections, such as the proper constitutional role of the courts in construing the

on the basis of important cases).
342
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Int’l Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).
343
See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y. TIMES (July 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-department-gays-workplace.html; see also
Coglianese, supra note 272, at 58–59.
344
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997).
345
See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 104 (2018) (“In recent years, we have seen a growing call from the federal bench,
on the Hill, and within the legal academy to rethink administrative law’s deference doctrines to federal agency
interpretations of law.”).
346
See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see
also Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052, 1052 (2018) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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law,347 the existing political climate suggests that there could be significant
adverse consequences to the Court’s approach to abandoning the doctrine.
The scope of Chevron deference expanded in the first decade after the case
that gave the doctrine its name. Shortly after the decision in Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Chevron, the D.C. Circuit interpreted the doctrine to
allow for broad agency discretion in defining ambiguous law, even in statutes
where the agency was not expressly empowered to engage in legal
interpretation.348 In the following years, the doctrine grew as the court took a
more expansive view of what provisions of law are “administered” by the
agencies.349 Courts also extended the deference afforded to agency constructions
of statutory text to agency interpretations of their own regulations, a doctrine
known as Auer deference.350 This trend toward greater agency policymaking was
consistent with the political climate, placing power in the hands of reliably
conservative presidents.351
Since 2000, however, Chevron deference has been eroded, both as a doctrine
and in popularity with academic commentators. Doctrinally, the Court in Brown
& Williamson found that Chevron deference was inapplicable to certain “major
questions.”352 Despite considerable uncertainty about the scope of that holding
at the time,353 it was applied more recently in the context of regulations to
enforce the ACA.354 In 2001, Chevron deference was further limited to agency
interpretations that had the force and effect of law, which narrowed the
substantive lawmaking power of agencies.355 For Auer deference, the Court
similarly circumscribed the doctrine’s scope, finding that deference may be
inappropriate when there are not sufficient indicators of reasoned judgment by
the agency.356 Despite these erosions, the core of the Chevron doctrine—that
347
For instance, Justice Thomas has written forcefully that both Chevron and Auer deference are
inconsistent with Article III, particularly the judiciary’s obligation to “say what the law is.” See Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing Chevron); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1222–23 (2015) (criticizing Auer).
348
See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
349
See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the EPA is
entitled to deference on reimbursement provision of CERCLA over dissent by Judge Williams).
350
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
351
See supra Part II.C.
352
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
353
See LAWSON, supra note 11, at 673.
354
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
355
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
356
See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (“Although Auer ordinarily
calls for deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, even when that interpretation
is advanced in a legal brief, this general rule does not apply in all cases. Deference is undoubtedly inappropriate,
for example, when the agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. And
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agencies have power to resolve ambiguous legal questions—has more or less
remained untouched.357
The academic debate surrounding Chevron has accelerated in recent years.
Many of the arguments for moving away from Chevron and Auer are
transcendental and internal, starting primarily from formal constitutional
premises.358 While Chevron deference can be understood in formal terms as a
division of power to interpret the law between the Judicial and Executive
Branches, a functional understanding highlights a delicate set of tradeoffs
generated by the doctrine in an era of partisan volatility.
One feature of this era is the increasingly partisan character of the judiciary.
Recent research suggests that Chevron deference constrains partisanship in
judicial decision-making.359 Shifting the more policy-tinged parts of legal
interpretation to judges might exacerbate the degree of partisan political
attention paid to the regulatory views of potential judges. This is especially the
case under the Court’s current doctrinal framework, with its emphasis on
increasing review of “major questions.” If political actors can expect that the
major policy issues of the day—even those delegated to administrative
agencies—will ultimately be decided de novo in the courts, then they will
expand their efforts to influence the nomination and confirmation process. Given
the degree to which judicial appointments are already politicized, further
incentives for a broader range of interests groups to wade into the process seem
likely to pose real risks to the legitimacy and independence of the judiciary.
On the other hand, greater political accountability leads to greater disruption
as ideological swings become more common. This is true for legal interpretation,
just like it is for the questions of policy discussed above. The Trump
Administration has taken a variety of legal positions different from its
predecessor,360 just as the Obama Administration took positions at odds with
deference is likewise unwarranted when there is reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation does not reflect
the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question. This might occur when the agency’s
interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation, or when it appears that the interpretation is nothing more than
a convenient litigating position, or a post hoc rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to defend past
agency action against attack.” (citations omitted)).
357
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Int’l Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).
358
See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2016). Defenders of
Chevron tend to focus more closely on pragmatic concerns. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 303 (1988)
(arguing that Chevron respects the distinction between law and policy).
359
Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics,
71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (2018).
360
See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y. TIMES (July 27,

LIVERMORERICHARDSONPROOFS_10.28.19

72

10/29/2019 10:51 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1

those of the Bush-era regulators.361 Chevron facilitates volatility for the subset
of questions that are entitled to deference.362 Under Chevron, an agency can
change its mind over time, so long as the new interpretation is still a reasonable
resolution of an ambiguous question.363 The same logic applied to Auer
deference. When an Article III court is the one deciding the law, doctrines of
stare decisis provide a much greater degree of stability. Scaling back Chevron
or Auer would limit the ability of agencies to shift views in response to partisan
volatility and may instead encourage them to spend their time on undecided legal
questions.
Understanding the political context of the debate over Chevron and Auer
helps bring the relevant tradeoffs into focus. Partisan volatility and polarization
increase the cost of allocating decisions to agencies, because they are likely to
oscillate between wildly conflicting views, with all of the associated undesirable
social consequences that oscillation entails. Greater assertion of authority over
statutory and regulatory interpretation could help stabilize the situation, by
placing control in a relatively less volatile institution. However, abandoning
Chevron and Auer risks politicizing the judiciary even further, as courts find
themselves inserted into policy questions, without even the doctrines of
deference to help shield them from political scrutiny and criticism. If courts
become a major forum for policymaking on a greater number of issues, an
expanded set of interest groups will feel compelled to participate in the process
of judicial appointments, further politicizing an already deeply polarizing
process.
CONCLUSION
Modern politics poses a very real threat to the U.S. administrative state.
Ideological positions are further apart, and swings between them are
increasingly common. Cooperative incentives are low, and national partisan
conflict extends to the states and the courts. While administrative law has in the
past adapted to match new political realities, such an adjustment is not necessary
or inevitable, as current doctrinal trends demonstrate.

2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-department-gays-workplace.html.
361
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
362
For example, questions of statutory interpretation are at the heart of the dispute over the Clean Power
Plan, leading to the potential for substantial volatility if those interpretations swing wildly between
administrations. See supra notes 225–227 and accompanying text.
363
See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843–44 (2012).
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Confronting the realities of the current era of partisan volatility opens the
possibility of transforming administrative law in ways that stabilize its
capriciousness and curb its worst excesses. By doing so, law can facilitate
administrative policymaking that is more stable and more forward-looking—
grounding administration in the values of neutrality, expertise, and impartiality
without sacrificing responsiveness to broad majoritarian desires. During a period
of increased volatility, public policy requires more than bare reactivity to the
most recent electoral happenstance, where each new electoral winner is roughly
as out of step as the loser. The goal of administrative law should be to facilitate
the flexibility that allows policy to respond to new circumstances, while also
insulating the administrative state from partisan whim. Historical experience
provides some hope that accommodation of this sort is at least possible. The
growth of the administrative state has not been a straight line, but rather a series
of specific adjustments to meet the demands of a political system. Once again,
new political realities present new challenges. Frankly acknowledging and
accounting for these challenges is the most basic precondition for meeting them.
In the future, new challenges will undoubtedly arise. The era of partisan
volatility will not be with us forever. After recent electoral victories, both major
political parties have boasted that they were on the cusp of breaking through the
period of volatility by building a political coalition capable of sustained power.
The slogan “demographic destiny” captured this optimism for Obama-era
Democrats,364 just as Karl Rove’s invocation of the “permanent majority”
buoyed Republicans years earlier.365 Obviously, neither came to pass. It may be,
however, that eventually a similar prediction will come true. If other features
hold, then American politics could soon be shaped by one dominant party,
pursuing a relatively extreme ideological agenda for a sustained period, while
being vigorously opposed by a substantial minority of the country. Unlike the
earlier periods of unified government, such as the New Deal, this new governing
majority may lack the constraining forces that were once imposed by party elites,
state and local politics, or a strong Congress. The challenges that such a system
would pose for effective administration would no doubt be very different than
the ones created by the current environment. What remains constant, however,
is the basic notion that these challenges can only be confronted once they are
understood.

364
See, e.g., Lisa García Bedolla & Kerry L. Haynie, The Obama Coalition and the Future of American
Politics, 1 POL. GROUPS & IDENTITIES 128, 132 (2013).
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Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The 2004 Presidential Election: The
Emergence of a Permanent Majority?, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 33, 33–34 (2005).

